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ABSTRACT
This report presents the results of examination and recovery activities 
performed on the TRUPACT-II 157 shipping container. The container was part 
of a contact-handled transuranic waste shipment being transported on a truck to
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico when an accident occurred. 
Although the transport vehicle sustained only minor damage, airborne transuranic 
contamination was detected in air samples extracted from inside 
TRUPACT-II 157 at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Consequently, the shipping
container was rejected, resealed, and returned to the Idaho National Engineering 
and Environmental Laboratory where the payload was disassembled, examined,
and recovered for subsequent reshipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. This
report documents the results of those activities. 
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vSUMMARY 
On August 23, 2002, a shipment of contact-handled transuranic waste 
consisting of two TRUPACT-II (transuranic package for transportation, Type II) 
containers, each containing 14 waste drums, was assembled at the Radioactive 
Waste Management Complex (RWMC) on the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory (INEEL), and transported to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in 
New Mexico for long-term storage. On August 25, 2002, just prior to arriving at 
WIPP, the shipment was involved in a vehicle accident. During the shipment 
receipt process at WIPP, sampling of the radiological assessment filter (RAF) on 
shipping container TRUPACT-II 157 indicated airborne alpha-contamination of 
the inner containment vessel (ICV). Consequently, on August 29, 2002, 
TRUPACT-II 157 was returned to the INEEL to perform recovery and 
examination of the payload.  
TRUPACT-II 157 was disassembled and examined inside the INEEL Test 
Area North (TAN) Hot Shop in accordance with procedures approved by the 
Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID) and Carlsbad Field 
Office of DOE. Recovery, examination and repackaging of the payload drums 
was performed from January 27 to February 3, 2003. On February 3 and 4, 2003, 
the outer containment vessel (OCV), ICV, and 14 waste drums were transported 
back to the RWMC . On February 5, 2003, the standard waste boxes containing 
the TRUPACT-II 157 payload drums (excluding one drum found with surface 
contamination) were placed into three TRUPACT-IIs for return to WIPP. The 
shipment left the INEEL on February 12, 2003, arriving at WIPP February 13, 
2003, where the payloads were placed underground on February 19, 2003. 
During the recovery process, videos, still-shot photos, air samples, and 
smears were taken of the OCV, ICV, various packaging components, and the 
55-gal drums that made up the payload. Disassembly and recovery of the 
TRUPACT-II 157 payload was conducted smoothly and successfully, without 
complication.  
This report addresses only observations made during the recovery and 
examination of TRUPACT-II 157 per approved examination plan PLN-1169. 
The examination was not a root cause investigation. The examination of the 
TRUPACT-II 157 provided the following results:  
x The vehicle accident did not compromise the integrity of the 
TRUPACT-II 157 shipping container as evidenced by the following: 
 No physical damage was observed on either the OCV or the ICV  
 No contamination was found on the exterior or interior of the OCV 
 No contamination was found external to the ICV. 
x The vehicle accident did not cause the contamination found in 
TRUPACT-II 157 as evidenced by the following: 
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 No damage was found on the ICV lid or the honeycomb spacers, 
slip sheets, or guide tubes inside the ICV 
 No physical damage was evident on the drums inside the ICV  
 No shifting of the payload was apparent. 
x The contamination found on Drum IDRF741202484 was contained within 
the ICV.
x The ICV was found to be under vacuum after over 4 months storage prior 
to initiating the recovery operation. This attests to the high integrity and 
sealing capability of the TRUPACT-II shipping container. 
x Drum IDRF741202484 was found to have localized contamination on top 
of the drum lid. The contamination found was up to 110 dpm/100 cm2
alpha, which exceeds the limit of 20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha.
 Radiological analysis of the contamination showed it to be 
consistent with the drum’s radiological contents.  
x Drum IDRF741202484 was also found to have a loose lock-ring bolt, such 
that the lock ring could be rotated by hand.  
x Contamination smears of drum surfaces adjacent to and below the lock 
ring of Drum IDRF741202484 were within limits. The first smear on and 
around the filter was also within limits. The follow-up smear on and 
around the filter was above the alpha limit but the smear extended farther 
onto the drum lid surface. 
x The results of the examination did not conclusively identify the exact 
leakage point from drum IDRF741202484. However, it was confirmed that 
this drum was the source of the contamination. 
x A loose lock-ring bolt jam nut was also discovered on Drum 
IDRF74700411, although the lock-ring bolt was secure. 
 This drum did not have contamination above limits. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A special thanks to the following people and organizations for successfully
recovering and over-packing the waste drums from TRUPACT-II 157, and for
providing information for this report.: 
x 3100 m3 Project personnel from the Radioactive Waste Management Complex
x Operations personnel under supervisor D. A. Wale and foreman K. L. Kynaston from
Test Area North
x Radiological control technicians under foreman Gary Lusk from Test Area North
x Carpenters from Test Area North who constructed the work platform, ICV box, payload 
sleeving, and contamination control tent
x Quality engineering support personnel from the 3100 m3 Project and TAN Operations 
organizations.
x DOE-ID and CBFO support for the recovery.
x R. B. King for providing Technical Editing. 
x Chris Morgan for video editing.
vii
viii
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................. iii
SUMMARY.................................................................................................................................................. v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..........................................................................................................................vii
ACRONYMS.............................................................................................................................................xiii
1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 TRUPACT-II 157 Shipment and Accident .............................................................................. 1
1.2 Radiological Data on TRUPACT-II 157 Taken at WIPP ........................................................ 1
1.3 Return Shipment and Storage at the INEEL ............................................................................ 2
1.4 TRUPACT-II Assembly .......................................................................................................... 3
1.4.1 14-Drum Payload Configuration in TRUPACT-II 157 ................................................. 5
1.5 Recovery Plan .......................................................................................................................... 6
1.5.1 TRUPACT-II 157 Recovery Plan.................................................................................. 6
1.5.2 Description of the TAN-607 Hot Shop.......................................................................... 9
2. THE PAYLOAD EXAMINATION PLAN ..................................................................................... 10
3. QUALITY ASSURANCE................................................................................................................ 11
4. RECOVERY, EXAMINATION, AND DISCUSSION ................................................................... 12
4.1 Recovery Operations.............................................................................................................. 12
4.2 Sequence of Operations ......................................................................................................... 15
4.2.1 OCA/ICV Handling and Payload Removal ................................................................. 15
4.2.2 Drum Examination and Over-packing Operations ...................................................... 17
4.2.3 Abnormalities Found During the Examination............................................................ 20
4.2.4 Handling of the SWBs and Removal from TAN Hot Shop......................................... 22
4.3 Radioactive Contamination Surveys of TRUPACT-II 157.................................................... 23
4.4 List of Facts Relevant to TRUPACT-II 157  Recovery and Examination............................. 25
5. RESULTS......................................................................................................................................... 27
6. RECOVERY OPERATIONS LESSONS LEARNED..................................................................... 28
7. REFERENCES................................................................................................................................. 29
ix
Appendix A—WIPP Reports, Accident Report, and Results of Surface and Airborne
Contamination Measurements .........................................................................................................A-i
Appendix B—TRUPACT-II 157 Payload #6469 Assembly Documents .................................................. B-i
Appendix C—Operating Procedures for Recovery Operations ................................................................. C-i
Appendix D—Examination Engineers’ Daily Log ....................................................................................D-i
Appendix E—Sequence of Operations and Equipment Used.................................................................... E-i
Appendix F—Video Log of Recovery Operations .....................................................................................F-i
Appendix G—Resumes of Investigators....................................................................................................G-i
FIGURES
1. TRUPACT-II 157 in the WMF-628 storage module at the RWMC. ................................................. 3
2. TRUPACT-II outer containment assembly (adapted from Reference 2). .......................................... 4
3. TRUPACT-II closure/seal area (adapted from Reference 3). ............................................................ 5
4. Example of TRUPACT-II 14-drum payload configuration (adapted from Reference 2)................... 6
5. Configuration of payload.................................................................................................................... 7
6. Aerial view of TAN............................................................................................................................ 9
7. Payload disassembly and drum examination tent............................................................................. 13
8. ICV lid with sleeving and surrounding work platform..................................................................... 13
9. Processing tent and payload in sleeving prior to lowering into tent................................................. 14
10. Outer playpen with staged SWBs and ICV box. .............................................................................. 15
11. ICV lid separation in sleeve. ............................................................................................................ 17
12. Lifting the payload from the ICV. .................................................................................................... 18
13. Photo of the tamper indicating seal for IDRF741202484................................................................. 20
14. Drum IDRF741202484 inside the examination vestibule. ............................................................... 21
15. Photograph of lock bolt jamb nut position on Drum IDRF074700411. ........................................... 21
16. TRUPACT-II 157 drum lid smear results. ....................................................................................... 22
x
TABLES
1. Summary of WIPP RAF samples from TRUPACT-II 157. ............................................................... 2
2. ICV and drum examination summary. ............................................................................................. 19
3. Results of air sample from inside of the sleeved ICV immediately after lifting the
lid by ~18 in...................................................................................................................................... 24
4. Comparison of actinide radiochemical analyses of INEEL drum assay and smears
with WIPP analyses of the radiological assessment filters............................................................... 24
xi
xii
ACRONYMS
ANL-W Argonne National Laboratory-West
CAM constant air monitor
CBFO Carlsbad Field Office of DOE 
CH-TRU contact-handled transuranic
cpm counts per minute of radioactivity
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
DOE-ID U.S. Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office 
dpm disintegrations per minute of radioactivity
ICV inner containment vessel
INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
in. Hg inch mercury column—a unit of pressure equal to about ½ psi 
OCA outer containment assembly (consisting of the OCV, ICV, and Payload)
OCV outer containment vessel (without ICV and Payload)
psig pounds per square inch pressure, gauge 
RAF radiological assessment filter 
RWMC Radioactive Waste Management Complex
SWB DOT 7A standard waste box
SWEPP Stored Waste Examination Pilot Plant 
TAN Test Area North
TRU transuranic 
TRUPACT-II transuranic package for transportation, Type II 
VOC volatile organic compound
WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
xiii
xiv
TRUPACT-II 157 Payload Examination Report 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this report is to document the results of performing the work described in the 
TRUPACT 157 Payload Examination Plan.1 The examination was not a root cause investigation. The 
scope of the report included documentation of the recovery operations procedures, as-found condition of
the payload and shipping containers before and during recovery, results of contamination measurements,
examination log, compilation of the information collected during the examination that may be used to 
support transportation and disposition of the inner containment vessel (ICV), documentation of auxiliary
examination activities such as containment tents and over-packing of the payload, and lessons learned 
from the recovery effort. Video tapes, DVD discs, and still images were to be provided to supplement the 
written report as directed by the project manager.
1.1 TRUPACT-II 157 Shipment and Accident 
On August 23, 2002, a shipment (IN020271) containing two TRUPACT-II (transuranic packages 
for transportation, Type II) shipping containers (151 and 157) was released for shipment from the Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 
in New Mexico. Each TRUPACT-II container was loaded with fourteen 55-gal drums of sludge and filter 
waste. The shipment was in radiological compliance with TRUPACT-II transportation requirements.
Those requirements are that a shipment have a radiological dose rate of <200 mrem/hr at the contact, 
<20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha (D) emitting radionuclides, and <200 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma (EJ) emitting 
radionuclides.
On August 25, 2002, the shipment was involved in a vehicle accident about 25 miles before the
WIPP truck arrived at WIPP. A pickup truck ran into the rear left of the WIPP truck trailer. Although the 
WIPP truck received little damage, the pickup truck was heavily damaged. After a full inspection by the 
New Mexico Department of Transportation, the WIPP truck was allowed to proceed to the site. The New 
Mexico State Police accident report and a Carlsbad Field Office of DOE (CBFO) analysis of the accident 
with photographs are provided in Appendix A.
1.2 Radiological Data on TRUPACT-II 157 Taken at WIPP 
After receipt and processing into WIPP, the TRUPACT-II 151 and 157 shipping containers were 
removed from the trailer and staged in the Waste Handling Building for unloading.
During the morning of August 25, 2002, the shipping documentation was reviewed and initial
surface radiological smears of the shipping containers were completed. No surface contamination was 
found on either TRUPACT-II. Unloading operations continued until an analysis of the filter, downstream
of the vacuum tool used to evacuate the ICV before lid removal, indicated elevated alpha activity in 
TRUPACT-II 157. The air sample was conducted by drawing a vacuum of approximately 4 in. Hg on the 
ICV through the vent port. The air sample passed through a radiological assessment filter (RAF). 
Although not calibrated to quantify airborne contamination, the RAF samples are used by WIPP to assess 
gross contamination inside the ICV prior to opening. The RAF was subsequently counted on an Eberline 
Alpha-6 continuous air monitor (CAM). Two measurements were taken 6 minutes apart, yielding
indications of 27–30 dpm alpha activity on the filter. The peak channel on the counter was indicative of 
plutonium contamination. The RAF filter was then transferred to the WIPP radiochemistry lab and 
subjected to a 10-minute gross alpha-beta count using a gas proportional counter. This indicated alpha and 
beta activity of approximately 30 dpm and 3.4 dpm, respectively.
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The following day (Monday, August 26, 2002), WIPP personnel developed and implemented a 
procedure to further assess TRUPACT-II 157. Using the procedure, three additional air samples were
drawn through the ICV vent port, each time allowing air to refill the ICV after the sampling. Following 
each sample, ambient air was reintroduced to the ICV over a period >1/2 minute, bringing it back to 
atmospheric pressure. The resultant RAF filters were evaluated in a manner similar to that reported above. 
The results of all four samples are summarized in Table 1 (see Appendix A for a complete summary of 
the operations and data collected at WIPP). WIPP personnel estimated the first sample to consist of 
0.2 m3 of air, and the remaining samples to consist of 0.7 m3 of air from the ICV. The difference in 
volumes was due to the first sample being taken using 4 in. Hg vacuum while the additional samples were 
taken using 12 in. Hg vacuum.
Due to regulatory considerations, the ICV could not be opened at WIPP. The potential existed for 
contaminating the inside of the Waste Handling Building. The most prudent course of action was 
determined to be to replace the outer containment vessel (OCV) lid, reseal the TRUPACT-II outer 
containment assembly (OCA), and ship TRUPACT-II 157 back to INEEL, which has facilities and 
personnel trained to handle contaminated waste containers, and where the payload could be evaluated.
Table 1. Summary of WIPP RAF samples from TRUPACT-II 157.
Sample
Designation
Sampling Date 
and Time
Alpha-6 CAMa
(cpm)
Gross Alphab
(dpm)
Gross Betab
(dpm)
Am-241
J-spec.c Pu-238d
Pu-239-
240d
TP157RAF 8/25/02
13:34, 13:40
5.7 and 5.3 29.7 3.4 2.6 0.7 19.9
157RAF-2 8/26/02
14:40
240 2530
(~1900)e
1090 176 Not
Available
Not
Available
2nd Pull 8/26/02
16:10
465 4380
(~3300)e
1450 309 Not
Available
Not
Available
3rd RAF 8/26/02
18:02
890 6030
(5500)e
794 464 132 1640
a. Gross count rate (cpm) in the Pu region of Alpha-6 CAM (efficiency ~20%).
b. Initial counting from the gas proportional counter in dpm.
c. Counted using a geometry-calibrated gamma spectrometer, dpm.
d. Results from radiochemistry extraction and alpha spectrometry, dpm.
e. Gross alpha dpm several hours after sample collection (without Rn decay progenies). 
1.3 Return Shipment and Storage at the INEEL 
On August 28, 2002, TRUPACT-II 157 was resealed and shipped back to the INEEL. When the
shipment arrived at the INEEL on August 29, 2002, TRUPACT-II 157 was off-loaded and placed into 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-compliant storage in building WMF-628 at the Radioactive
Waste Management Complex (RWMC) (see Figure 1), where it remained in monitored storage until an 
approved location and method of handling this Resource Conservation and Recovery Act waste was 
obtained.
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Figure 1. TRUPACT-II 157 in the WMF-628 storage module at the RWMC. 
1.4 TRUPACT-II Assembly
The TRUPACT II container has a USNRC Certificate of Compliance as a Type B with designation 
B(U)F under 10 CFR 71.12. The TRUPACT-II 157 assembly consisted of a standard TRUPACT-II 
shipping package and a payload of fourteen 55-gallon drums containing contact-handled transuranic (CH-
TRU) waste consisting of filter media and sludges (Appendix B). The TRUPACT-II containers are 
designed to transport transuranic waste to WIPP and provide contamination containment in the event of a 
payload leak.
A TRUPACT-II shipping package is composed of an OCA which includes an OCV, ICV, two 
aluminum honeycomb spacer assemblies, and the payload. The OCV provides a primary containment
boundary and acts as an environ-mental barrier, the ICV provides a secondary containment boundary, the 
two aluminum honeycomb spacer assemblies fit within the dished head at each end of the of the ICV, and 
the payload goes inside the ICV between the spacer assemblies. Figure 2 illustrates an exploded view of 
the TRUPACT-II packaging components.2 Figure 3 presents a detailed view of the closure/seal areas.3
The ICV and the OCA each have a seal test port and vent port. The seal test port in each vessel
provides access to the volume between the two o-ring seals that exist between the lid and body (upper and 
lower, respectively) seal flanges. The seal test ports are used to demonstrate the leak tightness of the seals 
and to verify proper assembly of the packaging prior to shipment. The vent port is used during loading 
and unloading to facilitate lid installation and removal. A negative pressure of 2 to 4 in. Hg (1 to 2 psig)
on the vent port is necessary to allow the locking ring to be freely rotated. At the receiving end of 
shipment, this same vent port is used to relieve any vacuum or pressure resulting from different
atmospheric pressures at the shipping and receiving locations. 
3
Figure 2. TRUPACT-II outer containment assembly (adapted from Reference 2). 
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ICV Lid
ICV Bottom
OCV Lid 
ICV Seal
OCV Bottom
OCV Seal
OCV Lid Locking Bolt
Figure 3. TRUPACT-II closure/seal area (adapted from Reference 3).
1.4.1 14-Drum Payload Configuration in TRUPACT-II 157 
The payload for TRUPACT-II 157 was the standard 14-drums containing CH-TRU waste. The 
TRUPACT-II has a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certificate of Compliance as a Type B with 
designation B(U)F) under 10 CFR 71.12. The payload was examined at the Stored Waste Examination 
Pilot Plant (SWEPP) and certified for shipment according to the WIPP Contact Handled Waste 
Acceptance Criteria. Prior to shipment, the drums were assembled into a payload in WMF-635. An 
example of a 14-drum payload and automatic center of gravity lifting fixture is shown in Figure 4. Each 
drum is a UN 1A2 55-gallon open-top, carbon-steel waste drum with a plastic liner and a vent filter
installed in the lid to prevent gas buildup in the drum. The eight older drums had Nucfil 020 self-tapping
filters added at the RWMC Drum Venting Facility. The Drum Venting Facility functions to remotely vent 
the TRU waste drums and insert a filter assembly into the vent hole. The filter assembly allows 
continuous aspiration of internally-generated gases while containing radioactive particulates inside the 
drum. The assembly consists of a gasket-sealed, self-tapping, hollow, round-headed screw with an 
internal filter element. The filters provide a removal efficiency of greater than 99.9% for 0.3 to 0.45 P
particulates. The filters are either inserted in a hole punched about 5 inches from the top rim, or in a bung
hole in the center of the drum lid. The remaining six drums were new, having been recently repacked at 
Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) in support of the 3100 m3 Project. These drums employed
Nucfil 013 bung filters in the center of the lid. Appendix B provides additional assembly information for 
the payload.
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Figure 4. Example of TRUPACT-II 14-drum payload configuration (adapted from Reference 2). 
TRUPACT-II 157 contained payload assembly No. 6469. Copies of the shipping documents with
information on the contents and weights are provided in Appendix B. Five of the drums, in payload
positions 1–5 contain filter media, the other nine drums contain sludge. The filter drums are placed on the 
second tier of the payload because they are lighter than the sludge drums. Seven of the drums had been 
opened and liquid absorbent added prior to shipment to meet WIPP free liquid acceptance criteria.
Figure 5 illustrates the drum positions, slip sheet orientations, guide tube locations, filter locations, and 
lock ring chine locations of the payload as they were found during the recovery.
1.5 Recovery Plan
1.5.1 TRUPACT-II 157 Recovery Plan 
Efforts to evaluate options for dealing with TRUPACT-II 157 were initiated in September 2002 at 
both the INEEL and WIPP. That same month, the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office 
(DOE-ID) and CBFO also decided to recover the payload from TRUPACT-II 157 to determine the source 
of contamination.
A draft recovery plan was developed and submitted to DOE-ID on October 10, 2002. The recovery
plan proposed using the Test Area North (TAN) Hot Shop building (TAN-607) to perform the recovery
work. TAN-607 was selected because of its capacity to accomplish the TRUPACT-II 157 recovery
operation while protecting workers and the environment. On October 11, 2002, a letter was received from
the DOE-ID Contracting Officer with direction to proceed and complete the recovery operation no later 
than December 31, 2002.4 The final Recovery Plan5 presented the INEEL approach for achieving the 
following objectives:
x Return of the OCA to WIPP as soon as possible 
6
Figure 5. Configuration of payload.
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x Remove the contaminated payload from TRUPACT-II 157 
x Inspect and collect data (photographs, radiological smears) of individual payload containers to 
identify the potential source of contamination
x Over-pack the contaminated payload drums into Department of Transportation 7A standard waste 
boxes (SWBs) in a configuration meeting TRUPACT-II payload compliance requirements 
x Receive the over-packed TRUPACT-II 157 at the RWMC for assembly, certification, and loading 
into TRPPACT-II shipping containers by the Carlsbad Field Office Mobile TRPACT-II Loading 
Team
x Complete shipment of the over-packed TRUPACT-II 157 payload to WIPP 
x Complete disposition of the ICV 
x Document results of payload inspection and lessons-learned.
Operational readiness and approval to start operations at TAN were completed on schedule, 
December 2, 2002. However, issues with obtaining regulatory approval to perform the work in the TAN 
Hot Shop developed in early December 2002. Alternative approaches to performing the required recovery
work that addressed the regulatory issues were evaluated during December 2002. A revised regulatory
approach that used a dual transfer facility concept was finally selected as the best option with which to 
proceed. This option capitalized on the successful mockup recovery operation previously performed at 
TAN.
The revised TRUPACT-II 157 Recovery Plan was approved in February 2003.5 This plan required
shipping the repackaged TRUPACT-II 157 payload to WIPP using the WIPP Mobile TRUPACT-II 
Loading Team to perform the loading operation at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant. TAN and 
RWMC procedures had to be modified to implement the building of certifiable SWBs, and the 
completion of certification activities associated with making another shipment to WIPP.
The recovery work, which was completed as planned, included:
x Revising the TAN Safety Analysis Report.
x Submitting regulatory documents to the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality.
x Developing a TRUPACT-II 157 Examination Plan (PLN-1169; Reference 1).
x Preparing an onsite transportation plan. 
x Developing operating procedures (TPR-6230 and TPR-6233)6,7 and associated work implementing
documents such as inspection plans, lift plans, and job safety analyses to direct recovery work. 
These closely mirrored the original implementing documents for the 3100 m3 Project. 
x Training and qualifying operational crews. 
x Constructing the work platform for access to the OCV and ICV lids, sleeving to contain 
contamination during lifting of the ICV lid and payload, and a radiological containment tent for 
payload processing.
8
x Completing a mockup of the planned operations.
x Completing a contractor management self-assessment to document operational readiness. 
1.5.2 Description of the TAN-607 Hot Shop 
The TAN-607 Hot Shop (see Figure 6) is a large, existing shielded facility containing a high bay
equipped with overhead cranes, a large overhead manipulator, auxiliary wall-mounted manipulators,
cameras, video-recording capabilities, and other equipment for remote-handling of radioactive material. 
Historically, this facility has been used to receive, manipulate, and store spent nuclear fuel and other 
highly-irradiated materials such as the Three Mile Island core debris. The Hot Shop has remotely operated
cranes and video cameras to allow remote operations for high radioactive or contaminated waste.
TAN-607
Hot Shop
Figure 6. Aerial view of TAN. 
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2. THE PAYLOAD EXAMINATION PLAN 
A Payload Examination Plan (Reference 1) was prepared and used to collect information on the as-
found condition of the TRUPACT-II 157 payload and shipping container, and to support disposition of
the ICV. The plan also directed documentation of auxiliary examination activities such as containment 
tents and over-packing of the payload as a reference for future recovery operations. The plan identified
additional information to be collected and the items to be included in this examination report. 
Concurrence with the plan was obtained from CBFO prior to commencement of recovery operations.
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3. QUALITY ASSURANCE
The recovery operations were performed using procedures that were reviewed and approved by
both the INEEL and CBFO under a qualified DOE Quality Assurance program. Quality inspection plans 
were prepared for the recovery operations and over-packing of the waste drums.8,9 Quality Assurance 
provided oversight and verification of the TAN handling procedures, assembly of SWB payloads,
assembly of TRUPACT-II payloads, final review of shipping documents for the shipment of 13 waste 
drums back to WIPP, and review of the final examination report.
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4. RECOVERY, EXAMINATION, AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Recovery Operations
Recovery operations were performed in accordance with existing TAN operating procedures and 
new recovery procedures TPR-6230 and TPR-6233 (References 6 and 7, see record copy in Appendix C).
Concurrence for the new recovery procedures and the Examination Plan was obtained from CBFO. The 
examination, which followed PLN-1169, was performed concurrently with recovery operations. The daily
log recorded by the examination engineers is provided in Appendix D.
The increase in alpha-contamination collected on the WIPP RAF filter through the progression of 
four samples indicated high levels of alpha contamination inside the ICV. During initial work planning at 
the INEEL, there was concern that taking additional air samples using the same vacuum sampling method
that was used for the RAF samples could continue to increase the contamination inside the ICV and 
complicate recovery efforts. Instead, the recovery team and Radiological Engineering decided to take an 
airborne radioactive particulate sample from inside the ICV immediately after the lid was lifted. This 
sample, which would comply with INEEL procedures, would assess the airborne contamination as part of 
the Radiological Work Package to protect workers during the recovery. This methodology was part of the 
Examination Plan and work procedures (Appendix C) that had CBFO concurrence prior to the start of the 
recovery operations. During the recovery, a change in emphasis was made to ensure that existing 
contamination in the Hot Shop did not contaminate the payload after the initial air sample and smears of 
the ICV were found to be uncontaminated.
The Hot Shop was prepared for recovery operations before TRUPACT-II 157 arrived. 
Contamination control measures were designed and implemented to control the expected airborne and 
surface alpha contamination. Zippers and gloves were added to an existing radiological containment tent 
and it was installed inside the Hot Shop to provide primary contamination containment during payload 
disassembly (see Figure 7). The design allowed for payload disassembly without personnel entering into 
the tent. The tent was divided into three vestibules to isolate payload disassembly, individual drum
examinations, and when necessary, bagging operations prior to transfer into the SWBs. Reclosable
openings were added to accept the payload, and a longitudinal zipper opening on the ceiling allowed the 
crane cable and drum lifting device to transfer drums through the tent between vestibules. A rolling cart 
was used to transfer individual drums out of the tent and a second crane was used to lift the drums and 
place them in SWBs. Windows and port gloves provided work access, while remotely controlled cameras
inside the payload vestibule and examination vestibule allowed the examination engineers to view and 
record the condition of the payload and drums without entering the tent. Six remotely controlled video 
cameras with pan and zoom, one bore scope camera, two video recorders, and one digital camera were
employed to record the operation.
A 40-ft-long primary containment sleeve was constructed to fit around the OCV so that internal
components such as the ICV lid and payload could be lifted from the inner vessel and contain any
contamination on the payload. The sleeve was fitted with window panels so the payload could be visually
examined with the ICV lid lifted approximately 18 in. off the cavity as shown in see Figure 8. The sleeve 
was constructed such that it could be sealed and separated from the main body, allowing individual 
components to remain contained after being removed from the OCA. A photo was taken of the payload in 
the sleeving after removal from the ICV and prior to placement into the tent through a ceiling opening 
(see Figure 9). 
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PD03-0084-01
Figure 7. Payload disassembly and drum examination tent. 
PD03-0078-008
Figure 8. ICV lid with sleeving and surrounding work platform.
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PD03-0078-0013
Figure 9. Processing tent and payload in sleeving prior to lowering into tent. 
A “playpen” area was set up outside of the primary containment areas to provide an intermediate
buffer area where drums could be smeared before placement into the SWBs (see Figure 10). The playpen
area consisted of a covered floor surrounded by a temporary partial wall approximately 30 in. high.
During recovery operations, these zones changed designations between radiological buffer area and 
contamination area, depending on the nature of the current operation and status of zone smears. The work 
area was periodically surveyed before, during, and after the recovery operation in the Hot Shop to verify
(a) that existing contamination in other areas of the Hot Shop had not contaminated the ICV, OCV, and 
waste boxes, and (b) that the TRUPACT-II 157 payload had not contaminated the work areas. Copies of 
these surveys are provided chronologically in Appendix A.
A work platform was designed and built to accept the TRUPACT-II 157 assembly and provide
appropriate height for operator access to the vent ports, lock rings, and internals (refer to Figure 8). The 
platform was designed in two halves so that the vessel could be placed in the cut-out in one section, and 
then the other section placed around the vessel. Figure 8 and the other color photos of the recovery
operation were taken through a zinc-bromide shielding window, which provided little color contrast.
In addition to preparing the Hot Shop, the operations team trained on mockup assemblies prior to 
the arrival of the subject vessel. These mockups identified several minor improvements to the 
disassembly and examination procedures, resulting in a streamlined, efficient process for the final effort. 
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PD03-0078-053 
Figure 10. Outer playpen with staged SWBs and ICV box.  
4.2 Sequence of Operations 
This section summarizes the sequence of operations for the recovery. More information, such as 
times of occurrence, is provided in Appendix E. A list of the videotapes recorded during the recovery is 
provided in Appendix F. Resumes of the principal investigators are provided in Appendix G. 
4.2.1 OCA/ICV Handling and Payload Removal 
For clarification, this section presents radiological smear results as being “positive” or “negative.” 
A positive result indicates contamination above acceptable limits, a negative result falls within acceptable 
limits. Alpha and beta-gamma limits for surface contamination are <20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha and 
<1,000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma, respectively per PRD-183, Table 2.10 
On January 27, 2003, the vessel was lifted off the haul trailer by a forklift and transferred into the 
Hot Shop extension, where the cavity section of the OCA was wrapped in plastic to prevent possible 
contamination of the vessel by residual Hot Shop contamination. The vessel was then transferred into the 
Hot Shop and surrounded by the two-piece engineered work platform designed and constructed to fit 
around the vessel at an appropriate height for recovery operations.  
In examining the outer vessel, the team discovered that the vent port tamper indicating device was 
damaged; however, the OCV lid lock-ring bolt tamper-indicating device was still intact, indicating that 
the OCV lid had not been removed during storage. With verbal concurrence from CBFO, the decision was 
made to proceed with recovery operations. Radiological smears of the vessel’s outer surface found no 
contamination above acceptable limits.  
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Following TPR-6230 (see Appendix C), the workers lifted the OCV lid off the cavity and smeared 
the inner surfaces of the OCV lid and the newly exposed outer surfaces of the ICV lid. In addition, they 
took air samples to detect the presence of airborne radiation and volatile organic compounds (VOC). 
Once it was determined that all surface and airborne radiation and VOC results were negative (no 
contamination above acceptable limits), the OCV lid was moved to a lid stand.  
The workers proceeded to unlock the ICV lid. This entailed applying a 4 in. Hg vacuum on the ICV 
cavity via the vent port to allow the lock ring to rotate. During this process, an operator accidentally 
rotated the lock ring with light hand pressure prior to installation of the vent port tool. After the vent port 
tool was installed, it was determined that the ICV was already under 4 in. Hg vacuum, which explained 
why the lock ring had rotated freely, and no further pumping was required. The onsite CBFO and 
DOE-ID representatives were notified.  
After the ICV lid was unlocked, but prior to lifting it off the cavity, workers lowered a plastic 
containment sleeve over the OCA and attached it to the outer vessel below the lid joint. The containment 
sleeve was constructed such that as each item was removed from the OCA it would remain within the 
containment sleeve, which could be sealed and severed at predetermined locations to maintain 
containment around each component. 
Workers then lifted the sleeve-covered ICV lid approximately 18 in. off the cavity (see Figure 8) 
and smeared the inner surfaces of the lid and top surfaces of the payload. A radiological air sample was 
also taken from within the ICV and counted. All smears were negative (no contamination above 
acceptable limits). The main purpose of the air sample was to verify levels of contamination for personnel 
working on the payload. It should be noted that the air sample did indicate the presence of a significant 
amount of radon, a product of the decay of uranium in the payload contents. While not unexpected, this 
result confirms that the air sample came from inside the ICV cavity as intended, rather than through the 
HEPA vents on the plastic sleeving. Industrial Hygiene personnel took a VOC air sample, which 
indicated low levels of an unidentified VOC. Several volatile organic compounds were components of the 
waste. The air sampling results are included in Appendix A. With these results, the contamination sleeve 
was sealed and separated below the ICV lid, allowing it to be moved to the lid stand (see Figure 11). 
With the ICV lid removed, workers performed an extensive visual, video, and photo examination 
of the ICV interior and the in situ payload. A boroscope was used to seek for evidence of drum rupture or 
leakage and to determine the integrity of the drum lids and filter vents. Extensive surface smears were 
performed on the inner surface of the ICV, outer surfaces of the payload, and drum surfaces where 
accessible through the slip sheets. No physical anomalies were detected on the ICV, payload, or 
individual drums. The guide tubes in the payload were checked by hand and found to be loose, indicating 
that the payload had not shifted during transportation or during the traffic accident. 
Radiological surface smears of the ICV interior and payload exterior were all negative. Several 
swab smears were taken of the interior of the vent port, through which WIPP had drawn the air samples 
that indicated high levels of contamination. The swab smears were negative. 
Workers attached the adjustable center of gravity lifting fixture to the payload through small holes 
in the sleeve, and lifted the payload out of the ICV and into the containment sleeve. Radiation control 
personnel performed continuous smears of the payload as it emerged from the vessel. All smears were 
negative. They then sealed and separated the sleeve, and transferred the payload into the radiological 
containment tent. Once in place, they used the overhead manipulator to remove the sleeve from the 
payload, allowing further visual examination. No abnormal conditions were observed or recorded. 
PD03-0078-011
Figure 11. ICV lid separation in sleeve. 
Additional smears were taken of the ICV interior and the legs of the lifting fixture. When all 
smears were determined to be negative, workers removed the sleeve around the ICV, allowing further 
visual examination. Before the lid was replaced on the ICV, smears were taken, and video and several still 
photographs of the ICV interior were recorded. The assembled ICV was then lifted from the OCV, and 
the newly exposed surfaces subjected to visual examination and surface smears. As all smears were 
negative, the ICV was placed into its wooden disposal box as procedurally required.
Prior to replacement of the OCV lid, workers took surface smears of newly exposed surfaces, and 
conducted a visual examination. No anomalies were discovered, and all smears were negative. workers 
took additional smears of the OCV exterior after the lid was in place, but prior to its removal from the Hot 
Shop. All of these smears were negative. At approximately 10:00 a.m., January 29, 2003, workers
transferred the OCV out of the Hot Shop and placed it onto the transport trailer. 
Finally, workers staged six SWBs in the clean area of the Hot Shop to receive drums from the 
payload as they were examined and released. 
4.2.2 Drum Examination and Over-packing Operations
On January 29, 2003, at approximately 3:30 p.m., workers commenced examination and 
disassembly of the payload, with a 360-degree video examination of the exterior of the assembled
TRUPACT-II 157 payload drums. Over the next day-and-a-half, all 14 drums were removed from the 
payload, examined, smeared, and over-packed in their assigned SWB. The rest of this section describes 
the examination process performed. 
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As described above, the tent was divided into 3 vestibules: payload storage, drum examination, and 
transfer. Workers lifted each drum was off the payload using a drum lifting device connected to a cable 
from an overhead crane, and moved them from the payload vestibule into the adjoining examination
vestibule (see Figure 12). Prior to any further handling, workers conducted surface smears on the filter 
vent, top of lid, and lock ring. These samples were submitted for immediate counting while additional
smears were being performed over the side and bottom surfaces. Twelve initial smears were conducted of 
each drum. Maps of those smears are located in Appendix A. Drum IDRF741202484 located in payload
position #6 was found to be contaminated.
Workers conducting smears were especially careful to avoid the cross contamination of samples.
Concurrent with and subsequent to the contamination smears, the examination team conducted a video 
examination to determine the integrity of the container, lid, lock ring, and filter vent. This examination 
included the top, bottom, and 360-degree rotation of the drum side. Any anomalies were noted in the 
Examination Engineers’ Log (see Appendix D).
In cases where the drum lid initial smear results were negative (13 drums), workers manually
checked the tightness of the filter vent and lock-ring bolt. In the case where the drum lid smears were 
positive (Drum IDRF741202484 in payload position #6), they performed further smears and applied 
fixative to the affected area before conducting the manual filter vent and lock-ring bolt checks.
PD03-0078-012
Figure 12. Lifting the payload from the ICV. 
The examination was completed with an assessment of the container’s integrity. Copies of the 
completed container integrity checklists are included in Appendix B. When the remaining smear results of 
the side and bottom returned negative, the drum was moved from the examination vestibule into the 
transfer vestibule, where it was loaded onto a cart and rolled out of the tent. The single drum with positive 
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smear results was bagged prior to removal from the tent. From there it was lifted by a second crane and 
lifting device into a clean area where a Maslin smear was performed of all surfaces of the suspended
drum, before it was placed in the appropriate standard waste box. Table 2 summarizes the drum
examination results. 
As noted above, the initial smear indicated contamination levels above allowable limits on a 
localized region on the lid and filter of drum IDRF741202484. It was therefore handled differently from
the other 13 drums. After the initial smears of the lid returned positive (above acceptable levels), workers 
performed a second follow-up smear, which also showed levels above acceptable limits. Given that smear
results of the drum sides and bottom were all negative, the fixative was applied to the lid only. Following 
application of the fixative, the filter vent and lock ring was checked for hand tightness, similar to the other 
drums. The filter vent was secure, but the lock-ring bolt could be rotated slightly, about 5 degrees to the 
extent allowed by the tamper indicating device. The jam nut was snug against the lock chine. The drum
was then bagged, taped and placed in its SWB.
The examination engineers asked the operators to read its tamper indicating seal on the bagged
drum. While maneuvering the tamper indicating seal into a readable position, the operator discovered that 
the lock ring could be manually rotated. This action was repeated for the video record. The tamper 
indicating seal number was ANL-W 3963 (see Figure 13).
Table 2. ICV and drum examination summary.
Chronological
Examination
Order
Drum Serial 
Number
Payload
Position
Contamination
Results Comments
ICV Cavity - Radon levels much higher than back-
ground found in air sample of cavity
Airborne and smear alpha 
contamination within limits
1 IDRF004102263 2 - adjacent to seal test port 
2 IDRF004002801 3 - adjacent to vent port 
3 IDRF004101890 4 -
4 IDRF004102254 1 -
5 IDRF004002790 5 -
6 IDRF741202088 7 -
7 IDRF741202484 6 up to
110 dpm/100 cm2
alpha on drum lid 
only
Loose lock bolt, loose lock ring 
8 IDRF741205405 8 -
9 IDRF741201615 9 -
10 IDRF074700411 13 - Loose jam nut 
11 IDRF741201718 10 -
12 IDRF741204650 14 -
13 IDRF074700394 12 -
14 IDRF074221338 11 -
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PD03-0078-116
Figure 13. Photo of the tamper indicating seal for IDRF741202484. 
4.2.3 Abnormalities Found During the Examination 
The drum removal and examination process discovered two drums with abnormal results. Drum
IDRF741202484 exhibited a loose lock ring, and contamination on the drum lid that was slightly above 
acceptable limits (see Figure 14). Smears of accessible areas of the top and bottom of the lock-ring were 
within acceptable limits. A small area below the lock-ring where the drum lift fixture made contact with 
the drum surface could not be surveyed. However surveys of the lift fixture clamp after processing the 
drum were also within limits. The same situation exists for the lift fixture spacer above the lock-ring. The
spacer was located away from the lid contamination area. The lock ring closure gap on Drum
IDRF741202848 was estimated from the examination photographs to be 0.48 in.
Drum IDRF074700411 had a loose lock ring jam nut (see Figure 15), but the lock ring bolt was
secure and contamination smears were all within acceptable limits.
All other drums were in acceptable condition with contamination smears below acceptable limits.
Figure 16 shows the position of drums in their as-found orientation with respect to the ICV vent port, 
along with the results of radiological smears by drum sector.
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PD03-0085.01
Figure 14. Drum IDRF741202484 inside the examination vestibule.
PD03-0078-099
Figure 15. Photograph of lock bolt jamb nut position on Drum IDRF074700411.
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Figure 16. TRUPACT-II 157 drum lid smear results.
4.2.4 Handling of the SWBs and Removal from TAN Hot Shop
Individual drums from the payload were segregated by waste codes and over-packed into six
SWBs. After discovery of contamination above acceptable levels on Drum IDRF741202484, DOE-ID
requested that it be isolated in a separate SWB with three dunnage drums, and held for possible further 
investigation. Accordingly, on January 31, 2003, lids were installed and inspected on all SWBs except for 
SWB IDRFXBW030003, and the SWBs were transferred out of the Hot Shop. All the SWBs were 
smeared and found clean prior to transfer.
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SWB IDRFXBW030003 was held in the Hot Shop until February 3, 2003, when a seventh SWB
(007) was transferred into the Hot Shop to receive the contaminated drum IDRF741202484. The drum
was placed into SWB IDRFXBW030007 along with three dunnage drums. Because this SWB will not be 
shipped to WIPP, the bag on drum IDRF741202484 was not slit prior to closure of the waste box. A 
fourth dunnage drum replaced the subject drum in SWB IDRFXBW030003. These boxes were then 
closed, inspected, smeared clean, and transferred out of the Hot Shop at approximately 3:00 p.m.
February 3, 2003.
On February 4, 2003, the ICV in its disposal box and the seven SWBs were loaded onto trailers for 
return shipment to RWMC. The OCV had previously been loaded onto a trailer and delivered to RWMC. 
4.3 Radioactive Contamination Surveys of TRUPACT-II 157 
Over 350 contamination smears were taken on the inner and outer surfaces of the OCV, ICV, and 
individual drums during over-packing of the drums, and of the SWBs and equipment as it left the TAN 
Hot Shop. Dry Whatman 50 paper was used for the majority of the smears, with sticky-back cloth smears
being utilized for the follow-up smears on Drum IDRF741202484. Much of this information has been 
reported in previous sections of this report. All the contamination smears at TAN were counted for 
1 minute for alpha and beta with a currently calibrated Tennelec LB5100. Air contamination samples
were counted for 10 minutes. Complete information and smear maps for the TRUPACT-II 157 recovery
operations are provided in Appendix A, which also includes smear maps of Drum IDRF0741202484 in
storage at RWMC, prior to transport to ANL-W, upon receipt back at RWMC, and prior to shipment out 
with TRUPACT-II 157. 
An air sample of the ICV cavity volume was taken immediately after the ICV lid was lifted about 
18 in. above the ICV bottom while it was in the sleeving, prior to any additional smears inside the ICV. 
The sample was taken over 15 minutes and totaled 147 ft3. The initial count showed alpha and beta 
contamination, but the air sample was recounted at 30 and 90 minutes, and the calculated decay half-lives 
indicated that the contamination was primarily natural radon progenies, so the decision was made not to 
spray fixative inside the sleeving to control airborne contamination for personnel protection during the 
payload processing. By the following day, alpha and beta activities had lessened by 258 and 39 times,
respectively. Both had decayed almost to background levels by February 3, 2003. Table 3 lists the results 
of initial and delayed counts of air samples.
All smears yielded results within limits for surface contamination of <20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha and 
<1,000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma per Table 2-2 of PRD-183 (Reference 10) and Table D of 
10 CFR 835,11 with the exception of one drum lid; the initial smear from the lid of waste 
Drum IDRF741202484 was 39 dpm/100 cm2 alpha. Two of the three follow-up smears from the top of
that drum were also above contamination limits at 33 and 110 dpm/100 cm2 alpha, respectively. Smear
levels for the lid of that drum and the other drums in the top and bottom 7-pack of the payload drum were
shown previously in Figure 16. 
During the removal of drums from the upper pack, dirt and small stones were noted on the upper
7-pack lower slip sheet. This was expected since the slip sheets were stored in a part of the building open
to the outside and the payload was transported over a gravel road between buildings prior to shipment.
Some of this material was removed from the slip sheet via a sticky roller and smeared for contamination.
The results were within limits (see Appendix A).
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None of the other smears in the payload or in the ICV were above limits. Swabs of the inside of the 
ICV vent port through which the RAF samples were drawn showed no contamination. The payload slip 
sheets, reinforcement sheets, guide tubes, plastic shrink wrap, radiological contamination tent, and blotter 
paper on the Hot Shop floor were smeared for contamination after the drums were over-packed and 
removed from the Hot Shop. All results were within acceptable limits. A sample of the shrink-wrap was 
also submitted for gamma-scan; no contamination was found. The tent was stored in a box for possible 
future reuse as the smears indicated contamination levels were below limits. 
Table 3. Results of air sample from inside of the sleeved ICV immediately after lifting the lid by ~18 in. 
Date
Time of Count 
Count
Time 
(min) 
Alphaa
(cpm) 
Betab
(cpm) 
Alpha
(µCi/cc)
Beta
(µCi/cc)
Effective Derived 
Air Concentration 
Fractionc
1/27/03; 1700 1 206 446 9.37e-11 1.83e-10 47 
1/27/03; 1735 1 122 218 5.55e-11 8.97e-11 28 
1/27/03; 1835 1 40 86.38 1.82e-11 3.55e-11 9. 
1/28/03; ~0835 10 0.80 11.50 2.98e-13 1.76e-12 0.15 
2/03/03  10 0.40 9.00 1.28e-13 8.80e-13 0.06 
a. Efficiency for Į was 28% on 1/27/03, 29.9% on 1/28/03 and 2/03/03. Counts per minute (cpm) registered by the counter is 
corrected to disintegrations per minute (dpm) by dividing by the counter efficiency. 
b. Efficiency for ȕȖ was 31% on 1/27/03, 44.3% on 1/28/03 and 2/03/03. 
c. Per MCP-357, if the effective derived air concentration fraction is >= 0.3, then the sample is recounted after 90 minutes to
determine if natural activity is indicated. 
Two of the smears from the Drum IDRF741202484 lid and three smears from the inside of the ICV 
were analyzed for actinides by the INEEL Analytical Laboratories. The results of the INEEL analyses are 
provided at the end of Appendix A, along with the assay of Drum IDRF741202484 from the SWEPP 
Assay system. Table 4 compares the plutonium and americium results from the INEEL drum assay and 
analyses of smears. The smears match the original drum assay. Therefore, the contaminants in the drum 
lid are consistent with the drum contents. The ratios of Pu-239+Pu-240 to Pu-238 for the INEEL smears. 
None of the ratios of Pu-239+Pu-240 to Am-241 matched the original drum assay, which was likely 
because of americium stratification in the waste in the drum. 
Table 4. Comparison of actinide radiochemical analyses of INEEL drum assay and smears. 
SWEPP Drum Assay Analysis of INEEL Smears 
 Drum IDRF 741202484
Drum 
IDRF741202484 Lid 
Smears 4 and F1 
Inside of ICV
Smears 7, 2 and 7
Sample Date 3/6/2002 01/31/03 02/01/03 
Activity Ratios dpm/dpm dpm/dpm dpm/dpm 
Ratio Pu-239+Pu-240 to Pu-238  39.7 ± 26.6 41.4 ± 5.8 37.1 ± 15.4 
Ratio Pu-239+Pu-240 to 
Am-241a
0.065 ± 0.035 10.0 ± 1.2 9.5 ± 2.3 
a. None of the ratios of Pu-239+Pu-240 to Am-241 matched the original drum assay. This was likely because of americium 
stratification in the waste in the drum. 
4.4 List of Facts Relevant to TRUPACT-II 157
Recovery and Examination 
The following facts are based on examination of the payload and analysis of the results from the
TRUPACT-II 157 recovery and examination.
1. The initial WIPP RAF sample showed slight contamination of 30 dpm/spl gross alpha in an 
estimated 0.2 m3 of air. 
2. The follow-up WIPP RAF samples showed progressively higher TRU alpha contamination from
1,900 to 5,500 dpm/spl in an estimated 0.7 m3 of air.
3. The initial RAF sample was collected as part of the disassembly procedure as the ICV was 
evacuated to about 4 in. Hg. The additional WIPP RAF samples were taken by evacuating the ICV 
to 12 in. Hg. 
4. The tamper indicating device on the OCV vent port was visually intact, but the wire had pulled out 
of the brass seal, WIPP No. 0067. The tamper indicating device on the locking bolt for the OCV 
lock ring was still intact, which indicated that the OCV lid had not been tampered with.
5. The ICV was found to still have about 4 in. Hg vacuum after over 4 months of storage at the 
INEEL, attesting to the integrity and sealing capability of the TRUPACT-II shipping container. 
6. An INEEL air sample of a measured volume of 4.2 m3 (147 ft3) from inside the ICV taken 
immediately after opening initially showed 206 cpm alpha/spl. Delayed counting of the sample
indicated that (a) the alpha activity was primarily short-lived radon, which was expected to be 
present from decay of uranium isotopes in the wastes; and (b) the alpha contamination had decayed
to only 0.8 cpm/spl in less than 1 day.
7. Swabs of the inside of the ICV vent port through which the WIPP RAF samples were drawn 
showed no contamination.
8. The guide tubes were found to be loose during the payload examination indicating that the payload
had not shifted within the ICV from the vehicle accident,
9. No visual damage was evident on the OCV, ICV, aluminum honeycomb, payload or drums inside
the TRUPACT-II container. These indicate that the vehicle accident did not affect the 
TRUPACT-II or its payload.
10. Alpha contamination above the limit of 20 dpm/100 cm2 was found on a portion of the lid of
Drum IDRF741202484 in the payload. The initial positive result was 39 dpm/100 cm2 alpha; two 
subsequent positive results were 33 and 110 dpm/100 cm2 alpha. This drum was in payload
position No. 6 (see Figure 5). 
11. Radiochemical analysis of Drum IDRF741202484 lid smears was consistent with the contents of 
that drum.
12. The locking bolt and lid locking ring on Drum IDRF741202484 were loose.
13. The lock ring gap was estimated to be 0.48 inches from the examination photographs.
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14. Contamination smears of drum surfaces adjacent to and below the lock ring of 
Drum IDRF741202484 were within limits. The first smear on and around the filter was also within 
limits. The follow-up smear on and around the filter was above the alpha limit but the smear 
extended farther onto the drum lid surface. 
15. A jam nut on an uncontaminated drum (IDRF074700411) was loose; the lock bolt was tight. This 
drum was repackaged by ANL-W in April 2002. This drum was in position No. 13 in the payload, 
immediately below drum IDRF741202484. 
16. All of the drum filters were secure. 
17. No alpha contamination above allowable surface contamination limits of <20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha 
was found elsewhere in the payload, slip sheets, guide tubes, shrink wrap, inside of the ICV, or 
inside the ICV vent port.
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5. RESULTS 
The recovery and examination of TRUPACT-II 157 provided the following key results: 
x The vehicle accident did not compromise the integrity of the shipping container as evidenced by 
the following: 
- No physical damage was observed on the OCV or ICV 
- No contamination was found on the exterior or interior of the OCV 
- No contamination was found external to the ICV. 
x The vehicle accident did not cause the contamination found in TRUPACT-II 157 as evidenced by 
the following: 
- No damage was found on the ICV lid or the honeycomb spacers, slip sheets, or guide tubes 
inside the ICV 
- No physical damage was evident on the payload 
- No shifting of the payload was apparent. 
x The contamination found on Drum IDRF741202484 was contained within the ICV.  
x The ICV was found to be under vacuum after over 4 months storage prior to initiating recovery 
operations. This attests to the integrity and sealing capability of the TRUPACT-II shipping 
container.
x Drum IDRF741202484 was found to have localized contamination on top of the drum lid. The 
contamination found was up to 110 dpm/100 cm2 alpha, which exceeds the limit of 
20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha.
- Radiological analysis of the contamination showed it to be consistent with the drum’s 
radiological contents.
x Drum IDRF741202484 was found to have a loose lock-ring bolt, such that the lock ring could be 
rotated by hand.  
x Contamination smears of drum surfaces adjacent to and below the lock ring of 
Drum IDRF741202484 were within limits. The first smear on and around the filter was also within 
limits. The follow-up smear on and around the filter was above the alpha limit but the smear 
extended farther onto the drum lid surface. 
x The results of the examination did not conclusively identify the exact leakage point from drum 
IDRF741202484. However, it was confirmed that this drum was the source of the contamination.  
x A loose lock-ring-bolt jam nut was also discovered on drum IDRF74700411, although the lock-
ring bolt was secure. 
- This drum did not have contamination above limits. 
6. RECOVERY OPERATIONS LESSONS LEARNED 
The recovery operation was the first time a contaminated payload was recovered from a
TRUPACT-II. The TAN Hot Shop provided an excellent facility and staff for the recovery and 
examination operations, with appropriate expertise, tooling, and facilities in material handling, 
radiological control, and payload examination for efficient, uncomplicated processing of the payload. The 
following general lessons-learned were noted with the recovery. These lessons should be applied in the 
event that disassembly and recovery of another TRUPACT payload should ever become necessary.
x Mockup training proved highly valuable in streamlining and improving the recovery procedure,
and in preparing the crew for the required tasks. Several efficiencies in the procedure and design 
features of the containment were directly attributable to the mockup exercises. 
x Direct, early operator participation in the development of the recovery procedures enhanced the 
operational safety and efficiency.
x The INEEL radiological work control scheme (TRUPACT sleeving and three-section work tent) 
provided significant worker protection and efficiencies for the work process as demonstrated by the 
safe and rapid completion of the project activities in the TAN Hot Shop. 
x Open communication and coordination between the INEEL, DOE-ID, and CBFO during the
planning, review, approval, and recovery stages allowed the recovery to be conducted safely and 
within operational constraints. The efficiency of recovery operations could be enhanced by the
addition of a CBFO representative with signature authority onsite during recovery operations. This
would improve the timeliness of the team’s response to procedural changes necessitated by
recovery findings.
x An operator should be added to the recovery crew with the sole function of taking still photos of
processes and items of interest. A camera should be made available with the acceptance that it may
become contaminated.
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Appendix A
WIPP Reports, Accident Report, and Results of Surface and 
Airborne Contamination Measurements
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Electronic Copy of Appendix A
A-1
A-12
A-23
A-34
A-45
A-56
A-67
A-78
A-89
A-910
A-101
Thomas L Clements
03/24/2003 11:38 AM
To: Barry H O'Brien/BHO/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL, Kip E 
Archibald/ARCHKE/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL, Jeffrey M 
Lacy/LACYJM/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL
cc: Bobby A Picker/BAP/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL, Geneine D 
Staymates/STAYGD/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL, Jerry L 
Wells@Exchange
Fax to:
Subject: CBFO Accident Paper with Regards to T-157
fyi.
Thanks Jerry.
----- Forwarded by Thomas L Clements/TLC/CC01/INEEL/US on 03/24/03 12:06 PM -----
Jerry L 
Wells@Exchange
03/24/03 11:11 AM
To: Thomas L Clements/TLC/CC01/INEEL/US@INEL, Robert D 
Newbry@Exchange
cc: Jerry L Wells@Exchange
Fax to:
Subject: CBFO Accident Paper with Regards to T-157
Tom,
Attached is the accident paper CBFO generated with regards to T-157.
Regards,
Jerry
Accident_Unrelated
_to_ICV_contamination.
A-112
August 25, 2002 Pickup Truck Accident with INEEL Shipment to WIPP Not Related to Contamination 
Inside TRUPACT #157
TRUPACT 157 was mounted in the center position of the three-position trailer, with the second 
TRUPACT in the forward position and no payload in the rear position.  The pickup truck struck the 
trailer near the left rear fender area.  A horizontal fender member welded to the trailer frame and the 
left rear-most outer tire absorbed the bulk of the impact (and sustained virtually all of the physical
damage to the trailer).  The horizontal member also supported a mudflap and carried running lights.
Please refer to the accompanying photographs of the accident scene.
With the TRUPACT trailer traveling at ~40 mph and the pickup truck traveling at ~70 mph (accident 
report values), the relative impact was similar to that of a 30 mph accident (~60 ft/sec and 100 ft/sec 
respectively).  As the pickup truck struck the horizontal member, the mud flap broke free and the 
horizontal member bent up and forward.  As the horizontal member bent away, the outer tire of the 
rear-most axle was exposed and the pickup truck apparently rode up over that tire.  The impact forces 
at that point were directed up and to the left as the tire rotation spun the pickup truck up and outward.
The accident report shows that the initial impact point of the pickup truck back onto the pavement was 
24 ft forward of the impact point and ~5 feet to the left of the impact point.  The accident report also 
shows the pickup truck's continued path across the left lane of the eastbound highway and out into the 
median.  While the bed, cab, and frame of the pickup all broke up upon impact, and tumbled to 
separate locations, the center of mass of these parts came to rest about ~260 ft forward and ~35 ft to 
the left of the point of impact.  The fender and mudflap were knocked off the horizontal member and 
came to rest about ~110 ft forward and ~35 ft to the right of the point of impact.  The left outer rear-
most tire of the trailer was damaged and deflated.  Subsequent inspections of the condition of the 
TRUPACT shipping containers indicated no visible contact points with flying debris from the impact.
After inspection and escort to the WIPP site, the two TRUPACT containers were processed according
to standard unloading procedures.  All processes were normal until the air sample was collected from 
within the inner containment vessel, and the TRUPACT was re-sealed and shipped back to INEEL for 
recovery.
During recovery operations, it was determined that the payload assembly had not shifted within the 
inner containment vessel.  This was noted by the fact that the guide tubes inserted through holes in the 
four plastic slip sheets between the payload containers were clearly not bound and were still loosely in 
place.  If the payload assembly had shifted, even slightly, the guides tubes would bind in their mating 
depression in the TRUPACT pallet.  Even small lateral forces typically cause the guide tubes to resist 
when removed.  In the case of TRUPACT 157, the guide tubes were loose, implying the assembly had 
not moved from its position when loaded.  In addition, careful inspection showed that there were no 
apparent rubbing or abrasion marks between the payload containers and the inner containment vessel.
In summary, the pickup truck collision with the WIPP shipment did not cause or exacerbate the release 
of contamination into the inner containment vessel of TRUPACT 157.  The inertial differential 
between 80,000 and 2,500 lb vehicles is enormous.  Most of the pickup truck collision energy was split 
between bending the small horizontal member (holding the trailer fender and mudflap) and the 
spinning left rear-most tire.  There is indirect evidence that the payload had not shifted (even slightly) 
throughout transit and during the accident impact.   This information, along with physical evidence that 
the retaining ring of one of the payload containers was loose, leads to the conclusion that the 
contamination inside TRUPACT 157 was unrelated to the pickup truck accident.
A-123
Fig 1. Photo showing trailer after accident, with rear TRUPACT position empty
Fig. 2 Photo showing left horizontal fender member bent by Pickup impact
A-134
Fig. 3 Photo showing impact marks in the left fender member and damage to tire
Figure 4. Side view of impact area (left rear of trailer)
A-145
Fig. 5 Photo indicating no impact from flying accident debris
Fig. 6 Photo showing TRUPACT mounting fixtures still intact
A-156
Fig. 7 Photo showing fender assembly ~110 ft forward and ~35 ft to the right of the impact point
Fig. 8 Photo showing 1998 Dodge Pickup after the accident – the driver suffered only minor injuries
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A-178
A-189
A-1920
A-201
A-212
A-223
A-234
A-245
A-256
A-267
A-278
A-289
A-2930
A-301
A-312
A-323
A-47343
A-48354
A-49 365
A-50376
A-51 387
A-52398
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A-54410
A-33421
A-34432
A-35443
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A-38476
A-39487
A-4098
A-41509
A-42510
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________________________________________________________________________________
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMUNICATION 
Direct Read Monitoring Results 
________________________________________________________________________________
Date:     04/15/2003 
To:       DOUGLAS WALE                               MS: 9206   526-1102 
From:     TOBIN MOTT                                 MS: 5222   526-3688 
Subject:  TRUPACT REPACKAGING
________________________________________________________________________________
Location: INEL  TAN   607
_______________________________________________________________________________
Assessment:    3429.00 
Work Process:  OPERATIONS
Category:      WASTE PROCESSING
Task:          WASTE REPACKAGING
Industrial Hygiene performed area sampling, per MCP-153, relating to the 
repackaging of TRUPACT-157 at TAN-607.  Sampling is necessary to (1) determine 
workplace hazard levels, (2) determine appropriate control measures, and (3) 
ensure compliance with applicable procedures and standards. 
The sample results are specific to the following: 
THIS ACTIVITY WAS PERFORMED PER THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS:
TPR-6230 & TPR-6233 WITH CORRESPONDING JSA’S WERE USED.  THIS PROCESS WAS 
IDEALLY A ONE-TIME ACTIVITY.
THIS ACTIVITY INVOLVED THE REPACKAGING OF DRUMS FROM A TRUPACT CONTAINER TO
STANDARD METAL WASTE BOXES. THE DRUMS CONTAINED MIXED LOW LEVEL WASTE MLLW). THE 
WASTE WAS KNOWN TO CONTAIN VOLATILE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (VOC'S). CONTAINMENT AND 
VENTILATION WERE USED AS THE DRUMS WERE TRANSFERRED FROM THE TRUPACT CONTAINER 
TO THE STANDARD WASTE BOXES.
A RAE SYSTEMS “MINIRAE” PHOTOIONIZATION DETECTOR (PID) WAS USED TO OBTAIN REAL 
TIME VOC MEASUREMENTS. IT WAS ALSO USED AS A PUMP TO FILL TEDLAR BAGS. THE 
TEDLAR BAGS WERE THEN QUALITATIVELY MEASURED USING A BRUELL& KJAR (B&K) 
PHOTOACOUSTIC ANALYZER. HOWEVER, THE B&K ANALYZER WOULD NOT PROPERLY RESPOND 
DURING TO BUMP TESTING SO THE DATA WAS NOT VALIDATED. THE B&K DATA WAS 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION THEREFORE THE FAILED BUMP TEST WAS NOT CRITICAL IN 
DETERMINING EXPOSURE LEVELS. THE PID WAS THE PRIMARY INSTRUMENT FOR AREA 
MONITORING. IN ADDITION, THE HEADSPACE OF THE DRUMS HAD BEEN SAMPLED PRIOR TO 
THE REPACKAGING SO THE B&K DATA WAS NOT ESSENTIAL TO ACQUIRE QUALITATIVE 
INFORMATION. THE PURPOSE OF THE AREA SAMPLING WAS TO ENSURE NO ELEVATED VOC 
LEVELS WERE PRESENT. AREA SAMPLES WERE MAINLY COLLECTED IN THE HEADSPACE AREA 
WHILE THE TRUPACT CONTAINER WAS BEING DISASSEMBLED INSIDE CONTAINMENT PER TPR-
6230. AREA SAMPLING WAS ALSO PERFORMED IN THE GENERAL AREA AROUND THE TENT THAT 
THE PAYLOAD OF THE TRUPACT CONTAINER WAS DISASSEMBLED IN PRIOR TO DRUM 
REPACKAGING INTO STANDARD METAL WASTE BOXES. AREA SAMPLING WAS PERFORMED ON THE 
OUTSIDE OF THE TENT TO BE MORE REPRESENTATIVE OF WORKER EXPOSURE. ALL FORMS OF 
CONTAINMENT WERE EXHAUSTED THROUGH HEPA-FILTERED AIR MOVERS AT A DISTANCE OF 
APPROXIMATELY 20 FEET FROM ROUTINELY OCCUPIED SPOTS. SMALL PEAK LEVELS OF VOC’S 
WERE RECORDED BUT DISSIPATED OVER TIME. 
A-43521
HEAT STRESS MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN ON THE FIRST DAY AND STAY TIMES WERE NOT 
DEEMED NECESSARY.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Recommended Controls: 
Based on this assessment, the following controls were recommended for safe 
operation.
________________________________________________________________________________
Engineering Controls: 
    GENERAL DILUTION VENTILATION
    HEPA FILTERED EXHAUST
    NEGATIVE PRESSURE FULL ENCLOSURE
    PARTIAL ENCLOSURE
________________________________________________________________________________
Administrative Controls: 
    BARRICADES/PHYSICAL BARRIERS
    PREJOB BRIEFING
    DESIGNATED EATING AREA
    HAND WASHING FACILITIES
    HEAT STRESS MONITORING
    POLICIES
    AWARE OF BODY POSITION
    PROCEDURES
    SIGNS
    TRAINING
________________________________________________________________________________
Follow Up Actions: 
The actions noted below have been determined per MCP-153, Appendices A,B,C,E and 
F.  They are necessary to ensure continued safe operations. 
    NO UPDATE REQUIRED
________________________________________________________________________________
The sample results were: 
Sample:             1 
Agent:           HEAT STRESS
Sample Type:     DIRECT READ
Sample Comments: HEAT STRESS MEASUREMENT. DETERMINED STAY TIMES
                 UNNECESSARY BASED ON DRY BULB TEMPERATURES REMAINING STEADY.
     Sample     Sample                                Measured Value/ 
Seq# Date       Time  Location                        Exposure Limit  UOM 
---- ---------- ----- ------------------------------ ---------------- ---------- 
   1 01/27/2003 13:15 TAN-607 HOT SHOP AND TRUCK         56           WIBGET
                      EXTENSION
Sample:             2 
Agent:           ORGANIC VAPORS
Sample Type: DIRECT READ                                                  
Sample Comments: THE MINIRAE PID WAS USED FOR ALL DATA COLLECTION TO ESTIMATE 
VOC CONCENTRATIONS & ENSURES VOC LEVELS WERE NOT ELEVATED IN
VARIOUS LOCATIONS.
A-44532
     Sample     Sample                                Measured Value/ 
Seq# Date       Time  Location                        Exposure Limit  UOM 
---- ---------- ----- ------------------------------ ---------------- ---------- 
   1 01/27/2003 13:15 INSIDE CONTAINMENT AROUND         0.0           PPM
                      TRUPACT BETWEEN OCV AND ICV.
                      OCV LID WAS OFF.
                                                        5.0           PPM
   2 01/27/2003 16:15 INSIDE CONTAINMENT. ICV LID       0.3           PPM
                      WAS OFF & EXPOSED TO PAYLOAD.
                      EMPLOYEES WEREN'T INSIDE
                      SAMPLE SPACE.
                                                        5.0           PPM
________________________________________________________________________________
The sample results were: 
Sample:             3 
Agent:           ORGANIC VAPORS
Sample Type:      DIRECT READ
Sample Comments: THE MINIRAE PID WAS USED FOR ALL DATA COLLECTION TO ESTIMATE 
VOC CONCENTRATIONS & ENSURES VOC LEVELS WERE NOT ELEVATED IN
VARIOUS LOCATIONS.
     Sample     Sample                                Measured Value/ 
Seq# Date       Time  Location                        Exposure Limit  UOM 
---- ---------- ----- ------------------------------ ---------------- ---------- 
   1 01/28/2003 10:10 INSIDE CONTAINMENT. ICV LID       0.3           PPM
                      WAS OFF & EXPOSED TO PAYLOAD.
                                                        5.0           PPM
   2 01/28/2003 13:30 GENERAL AREA OUTSIDE TENT         0.2           PPM
                                                        5.0           PPM
________________________________________________________________________________
The sample results were: 
Sample:             4 
Agent:           ORGANIC VAPORS
Result Standard:
Result Time:
Sample Type: DIRECT READ                                                  
Sample Comments: THE MINIRAE PID WAS USED FOR ALL DATA COLLECTION TO ESTIMATE 
VOC CONCENTRATIONS & ENSURES VOC LEVELS WERE NOT ELEVATED IN
VARIOUS LOCATIONS.
     Sample     Sample                                Measured Value/ 
Seq# Date       Time  Location                        Exposure Limit  UOM 
---- ---------- ----- ------------------------------ ---------------- ---------- 
   1 01/29/2003 14:16 GENERAL AREA OUTSIDE TENT         2             PPM
                                                        5             PPM
These sample results are measures of hazardous agent levels present in workplace 
areas or materials.  In some cases, these results can be used to estimate or 
predict employee exposures.  However, they do not represent actual employee 
exposure levels.  Employee exposures can only be determined via personal 
monitoring.  The exposure limits (for airborne chemical hazards or physical 
A-45543
agents), that designate safe levels of employee exposure, are noted for 
comparison only. 
________________________________________________________________________________
Recommendations:
The purpose of the area sampling was to ensure no elevated VOC levels were 
present. Area samples were mainly collected in the headspace area, which did not 
present an exposure potential. Area monitoring was performed to verify controls. 
The controls were adequate to protect personnel. Please continue to adhere to 
control measures noted in the exposure assessment. 
Please contact me if you have any questions. 
cc:   JAN BILLS                                MS:3125 
      TOBIN MOTT                               MS:5222 
Uniform File Code:     5154 
Disposition Authority: A1-21.2-d-2 
Retention Schedule:    Cut off when the facility is dismantled.  Destroy 75 
                       years after cut off.  (EPI) 
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TRUPACT-II 157 Payload #6469 Assembly Documents 
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Appendix C 
Operating Procedures for Recovery Operations 
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Appendix E 
Sequence of Operations and Equipment Used 
Sequence of Events Prior to Recovery Operations
August 23, 2002, Transuranic waste shipment IN020271 shipped from INEEL to WIPP 
August 25, 2002, 1:30AM. Transport truck involved in collision with privately owned vehicle. 
August 25, 2002, 6:30 a.m. Shipment arrived at WIPP and processing was begun. 
Initial RAF sample drawn as part of receipt processing indicates elevated alpha contamination
within ICV. 
August 26, 2002. Three follow-up RAF samples were collected and counting begun. Samples indicated 
elevated airborne contamination within ICV.
August 28, 2002. TRUPACT-II 157 was resealed and returned to the INEEL. 
August 29, 2002. Shipment arrived at RWMC and placed in storage. 
October 10, 2002. Draft recovery plan submitted to DOE-ID. 
October 11, 2002. DOE-ID letter of direction to proceed received by contractor. 
October 17, 2002. Revision 1 of recovery plan issued. 
December 2, 2002. Operational readiness review completed and approval to start operations received on 
schedule.
Early December. Issues developed with respect to obtaining regulatory permits to perform recovery
operations.
December 24, 2002. DOE-ID issued direction to develop revised recovery plan by January 16, 2003.
January 16, 2003. Revised recovery plan issued. 
January 23, 2003. DOE-ID contracting officer issued letter directing execution of recovery plan.
January 27, 2003. Readiness achieved for operations at TAN. TRUPACT-II arrives and recovery
activities begin. 
E-1
TRUPACT-157 Recovery Operations 
January 27, 2003 
9:50 a.m. TRUPACT-157 was shipped from RWMC to the TAN Hot Shop on January 27, 2003, and 
placed in the TAN Hot Shop (Figure E-1).
PD03-0078-035
Figure E-1. TRUPACT 157 handling in the hot shop.
CBFO was contacted to clarify when a CBFO representative needed to be present for the recovery
operation. Direction received from CBFO was for the representative to be present during payload
removal.
10:21 a.m. Outer Containment vent port plug tamper indicating device was not intact. One wire had 
pulled out of the crimp seal. The tamper indicating device on the OCV lid lock ring bolt was still intact. 
Received WIPP direction to proceed. 
13:07 p.m. Removed the OCV Lid (Figure E-2). 
E-2
PD03-0078-03
Figure E-2. Removal of OCV lid. 
x Installed sleeving on the ICV (see Figure E-3). 
E-3
PD03-0078-006
Figure E-3. Sleeve installation on ICV. 
E-4
PD03-0078-008
Figure E-4. Air sampling of ICV interior and payload.
x ICV lid lifted approximately 18” and air sampling performed on internal ICV atmosphere. 
Sampling performed for 15 minutes using calibrated pumps (Figure E-4). 
4:20 p.m. Radiological smears of OCV and ICV are within allowable limits (less than 20 dpm/100 cm2
alpha and less than 1,000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma).
4:23 p.m. Air sampling results indicate only naturally occurring activity. Levels of contamination reported
by WIPP are not seen at INEEL based on this initial sampling. Elevated radon levels in sample, compared
to normal background, confirm that sample air was drawn from ICV interior. 
6:00 p.m. Operations ceased until WIPP representative was onsite for payload removal sequence per 
direction from WIPP. 
E-5
January 28, 2003 
8:35 a.m. Additional contamination surveys of ICV and accessible portions of payload. All radiological 
surveys are within allowable limits (less than 20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha and less than 1000 dpm/100 cm2
beta-gamma).
12:22 p.m. TRUPACT-157 payload lifted from ICV and placed into radiological tent (Figure E-5).
PD03-0078-013
Figure E-5. Transfer of payload into tent.
4:32 p.m. ICV sleeving removed and lid reinstalled. ICV removed from OVA and packaged in box.
Radiological surveys all within allowable limits. The inside of the ICV lid is shown in Figure E-6.
5:57 p.m. Outer Containment Vessel (OCV) surveyed and results within allowable limits. Lid installation 
completed.
E-6
PD03-0078-032
Figure E-6. Underside of ICV lid. 
E-7
January 29, 2003 
10:04 a.m. OCV removed from Hot Shop and reloaded onto transport trailer (Figure E-7). 
PD03-0078-0039
Figure E-7. Transfer of OCV from hot shop onto transport trailer 
x Hot Shop reconfigured to support TRUPACT-157 disassembly operations. Figure E-8 show the 
Standard waste boxes (SWBs) staged for receipt of waste drums. Figure E-9 shows the payload just 
prior to disassembly.
3:45 p.m. Initiated payload disassembly operation. Four drums from top seven-pack removed. Detailed 
radiological contamination surveys (12 locations on each drum) are all within allowable limits (less than 
20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha and less than 1000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma). Figure E-10 is a photo of smears 
taken of the first drum after it had been examined and it had left the tent.
x All drums were checked for filter and lock ringbolt tightness using finger-tight criteria. A container 
integrity inspection was performed by SWEPP operators. No discrepancies noted. 
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PD03-0078-054
Figure E-8. SWBs staged for receipt of waste drums.
PD03-0078-067
Figure E-9. Payload prior to disassembly.
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PD03-0078-072
Figure E-10. Smears of the first drum after leaving the tent. 
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January 30, 2003 
8:50 a.m. Fifth and sixth drum removed from top seven-pack layer. Detailed radiological contamination 
surveys are within allowable limits (less than 20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha and less than 1,000 dpm/100 cm2
beta-gamma). Finger tightness checks of filters and lock ringbolts do not identify any discrepancies. 
Container integrity determined to be adequate. 
9:22 a.m. Initial smears on the lid of the seventh drum (IDRF741202484) were: 9 dpm/100 cm2 alpha 
(drum filter area), 3 dpm/100 cm2 alpha (drum lid), 19 dpm/100 cm2 alpha (drum lid), and 39 dpm/100 
cm2 alpha (drum lid around bar code label). The smear of 39 dpm/100 cm2 alpha was above allowable 
limits. A photo of the first smear being taken is shown in Figure E-11. No other contamination above 
allowable limits was detected on other portions of the drum. 
x Three follow-up lid smears were taken and the results were: 110 dpm/100 cm2 alpha, 13 dpm/100 
cm2 alpha, and 33 dpm/100 cm2 alpha (drum lid around filter area). Two of these smears were 
above the limit of 20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha.
10:33 a.m. A glycerin-based fixative was applied to the drum lid to prevent any contamination spread. 
x 10:35 a.m. Drum IDRF741202484 lock ring bolt was found to be loose (about 5 degrees rotation to 
the extent allowed by the tamper seal wire). 
x Finger-tightness check of filter does not indicate any discrepancy. No container integrity 
discrepancies were noted. 
11:01 a.m. Drum IDRF741202484 bagged in plastic bagging. During removal, operator notes that the 
lock ring could be rotated about 2-inches (bagging prevents further rotation). Drum placed in standard 
waste box. Contamination surveys of both the top and bottom of the drum ring are within allowable 
limits. 
1:00 p.m. Processing of bottom seven-pack is initiated with removal of slip sheet and reinforcement sheet. 
1:05 p.m. Eighth and ninth drums removed from payload. Radiological contamination surveys are all less 
than allowable limits (less than 20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha and less than 1000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma). 
Finger-tightness checks of filters and lock ringbolts do not identify any discrepancies. No container 
integrity discrepancies were noted. Figure E-12 shows the ninth drum being lowed into the SWB. 
2:08 p.m. Tenth drum (IDRF74700411) radiological contamination surveys are all less than allowable 
limits (less than 20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha and less than 1000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma). Finger-tightness 
checks of filter and bolt do not identify any discrepancies. However, visual observation of jam nut 
indicates the nut was not seated against the lock ring. No container integrity discrepancies were noted. 
2:48–6:07 p.m. Processing of eleventh through fourteenth drums completed. All radiological 
contamination surveys are within allowable limits (less than 20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha and less than 
1,000 dpm/100 cm2 beta-gamma). Finger-tightness checks of the filters and lock ringbolts do not identify 
any discrepancies. No container integrity discrepancies were noted. Drum handling operations at 5:00 
p.m. are shown in Figure E-13. 
4:50 p.m. Gamma scans of plastic wrap from payload discover no contamination above background. 
PD03-0078-108
Figure E-11. Drum 2484 Smear 1. 
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PD03-0078-093
Figure E-12. Ninth drum being lowered into an SWB.
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PD03-0078-108
Figure E-13. Drum handling operations.
E-14
January 31, 2003 
7:00 a.m – 7:00 p.m. Completed closure of five of six SWBs containing the TRUPACT-157 payload
drums. Figure E-14 shows SWB IDRFXWB030001 prior to closure.
x Received direction from DOE-ID to recover the contaminated drum (IDRF741202484) from the 
standard waste box and place in separate SWB for future testing. Direction also received to keep 
the OCV and ICV in storage at RWMC pending future decisions. 
x Relocated completed SWBs from Hot Shop to Warm Shop for staging.
PD03-0078-121
Figure E-14. IDRFXWB030001 with four drums of filter waste. 
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February 1-2, 2003 
- Implemented procedural changes to TAN procedure to allow removal of contaminated drum.
- Modified procedure submitted to WIPP for approval.
- Modifications to WWIS to support SWB payload configuration changes. 
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February 3, 2003 
Obtained WIPP approval of procedure changes.
7:00 a.m–2:43 p.m. Completed removal of contaminated drum and transfer into SWB #7 and lid closure. 
3:10 p.m. SWBs #3 and #7 transferred out of hot shop to await transfer to RWMC. 
3:45 p.m. Completed ICV box closure, and transferred onto transport trailer (Figure E-15). 
4:54 p.m. Completed loading all seven SWBs and the ICV for transport to RWMC.
PD03-0079-05
Figure E-15. ICV in disposal box being loaded on transport trailer. 
OCV transported to RWMC for storage (Figure E-16). 
7:00 p.m. Radiological smears of slipsheets, remaining shrink-wrap, guide tubes, pallet, and containment
tent completed. All results were less than allowable limits. 
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February 4, 2003 
9:30 a.m. ICV and seven SWBs shipped to RWMC 
PD03-0079-10
Figure E-16. Seven SWBs and ICV departing for RWMC.
- ICV and one SWB containing the contaminated drum IDRF741202484 stored in WMF-628
- Six SWBs delivered to Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project building WMF-618 for
loading by the WIPP Mobile TRUPACT-II Loading Team.
February 5, 2003 
WIPP Mobile Loading Team completes loading of six SWBs containing the TRUPACT-157 payload
drums (minus one drum) into three TRUPACT-II’s.
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February 12, 2003 
Assimilation, review, certification, and release of TRUPACT-II shipment containing the TRUPACT-157 
payload (minus one drum) completed.
3:20 p.m. Shipment IN030001 leaves RWMC destined for WIPP (Figure E-17). 
PD03-0080-01
Figure E-17. Loaded TRUPACT-II depart for WIPP. 
February 13, 2003 
Shipment IN030001 arrives at WIPP. 
February 19, 2003 
Six SWBs containing TRUPACT-157 payload (minus one drum) emplaced at WIPP.
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Appendix F 
Video Log of Recovery Operations 
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Appendix F 
Video Log of Recovery Operations 
Digital photos taken during operations, with descriptions have been interspersed throughout the
report. Therefore, they have not been included in this appendix. Six remotely controlled cameras, one 
boroscope camera were used during the operations. One camera was recorded from the main monitor, and 
four of the cameras were recorded from a four-screen/split screen monitor starting on February 23, 2003.
Twenty-nine videotapes were recorded during the recovery operations and are described in Table F-1. A 
more detailed summary of activities and elapsed tape times for the Main Monitor videotapes is provided 
in Table F-2. 
Three segments of video showing the smears of drum IDRF741202484 are included in electronic 
MPEG movie format on this disk with the Appendices. They are the initial smears, initial smears of the 
drum bottom, and follow-up smears of the lid, that are included in the electronic copy of this report. A 
separate video of the entire processing sequence for drum IDRF741202484 is also provided on the disk.
Table F-1. Log of videotapes recorded during recovery operations.
Date
Main
Monitor
Tape No.
Time (24 hr 
format)
Split
Screen
Tape No. Time Activities / Notes / Observations
1/27/2003 1 1002 -- 1307 
TRUPACT- 157 moved into hot shop, initial disassembly
operations.
2
1307 -- 1442,
1535 -- 1548,
1605 -- 1623 
Remove OCV lid, vent port survey. Surveys inside ICV and
air samples of ICV volume. 
3 1623 -- 1756 
Remove ICV lid, visual and puppet CAM inspections of 
payload inside ICV.
1/28/2003 4
0833 -- 1257
(intermittent) 1SS 1225 -- 1428 
Continue surveys of ICV and payload. Puppet CAM
inspection of drum filters. Remove payload from ICV.
Conduct surveys of payload.
5
1259 -- 1330,
1341 -- 1417,
1618 -- 1702 2SS 1618 -- 
Payload into tent. ICV Sleeve removed, Inspect interior and
rad surveys of inside of ICV. Power glitches cause videotape
outages.
6 1702 -- 1813 2SS --1813
ICV reassembled and placed in disposal box. OCV
reassembled
1/29/2003 7
0914 -- 1026,
1114 -- 1127,
1231 -- 1301 3SS 1234 -- 1444 
OCV re-surveyed and moved out of hot shop. SWBs staged 
in hot shop. 
8
1301 -- 1418,
1501 -- 1546 4SS 1444 -- 
Video inspection of payload, remove wrapping and top slip 
sheet from payload.
9 1546 -- 4SS --1643
Drum IDRF004102263 inspected and moved to SWB, Drum
IDRF004002801 inspected.
9 -- 1745 5SS 1643 -- 
IDRF004002801moved to SWB 0001. Drum 
IDRF004101890 inspected and moved to SWB 0001.
10 1745 -- 1815 5SS -- 1818 Drum IDRF004102254 inspected and moved to SWB 0001 
F-1
Table F-1. (Continued).
Date
Main
Monitor
Tape No.
Time (24 hr 
format)
Split
Screen
Tape No. Time Activities / Notes / Observations
1/30/2003 11 0835 -- 1038 6SS 0836 -- 1035 
Drum IDRF004002790 inspected and moved to SWB 0002. 
Video inspection of top pack lower slip sheet. Drum
IDRF741202088 inspected and moved to SWB 0003. Drum 
IDRF741202484 inspection begins 0952. 
Date
Main Tape 
No. Time
Split
Screen
Tape No. Time Activities / Notes / Observations
1/30/2003 12
1045 -- 1104,
1106 -- 1110,
1254 -- 7SS
1035 -- 1147,
1250 -- 1353 
Drum IDRF741202484 bagged and taped. Drum lockring
rotated by hand. Drum moved to SWB 0003. Upper 
slipsheet and wrapping removed from lower payload pack. 
Drum IDRF741205405 inspected, moved to SWB 0003. 
Drum IDRF741201615 inspected. 
12 -- 1430 8SS 1353 -- 
IDRF741201615 moved into SWB 0003. Drum 
IDRF074700411 inspected.
13
1430 -- 1518,
1645 -- 8SS
-- 1518, 1630 --
1705
IDRF074700411 into SWB. Drum IDRF741201718
inspected and moved to SWB 0004. Drum IDRF741204650 
inspected and moved to SWB 0004. 
13 -- 1804 9SS 1705 -- 
Drum IDRF074700394 inspected and moved to SWB 0006, 
Drum IDRF074221338 inspected.
14 1804 -- 1810 9SS --1815 Drum IDRF074221338 moved to SWB 0003. 
1/31/2003 14
0815 -- 0919,
0958 -- 1051 10SS
0817 -- 0920,
1005 -- 1102 
Examination of TID on bagged drum IDRF741202484.
Visual examination of lower pack bottom slip plate.
Inspection of dunnage drums. Begin removing rain water
from dunnage drums.
15
1053 -- 1121,
1252 -- 1331,
1343 -- 1436 11SS
1113 -- 1123,
1254 -- 1327,
1344 -- 
Replace damaged gasket sections on SWBs. Dunnage drums 
removed from SWB 0002, inspected for rain water, and
returned to the SWB. SWB lids placed on boxes, begin
installing bolts.
16
1436 -- 1449,
1552 -- 1715 11SS -- 1451
Torque wrench fails, obtain new torque wrench. All SWBs 
except 0003 closed, surveyed, and moved to warm shop for 
weekend storage.
2/3/2003 17 1304 -- 1507 
Removal of drum IDRF074700484 from SBW 
IDRFXWB030003 and placement in IDRFXB030007. 
Installation of dunnage drums, and torqueing of the SBW 
lids. Removal of the SBWs from the TAN Hot Shop.
18 1509 -- 1518 Removal of the SBW's from the TAN Hot Shop. 
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Table F-2. TRUPACT-II 157 Main Monitor Videotape Detailed Summary
Start Location on Tape 
(Elapsed Time)
Tape # Description Hr Min Sec
1 TRUPACT assembly rolls into hot shop extension 0 00 05
1 Trupact assembly placed in work platform 0 14 41
1 Second half of work platform placed 0 31 20
1 Cover OCA Lid with plastic 0 45 00
1 Tape plastic to lid 0 48 00
1 Lifting fixture legs into OCV lid pockets 1 19 40
1 Lift OCA lid and survey 1 56 00
2 Move OCV Lid 0 07 25
2 Lifting fixture to ICV Lid 0 15 10
2 Check Lock ring 0 20 55
2 Sleeve around vessel 0 54 14
2 ACGLF to ICV (unsure about this shot) 1 21 30
2 Lift ICV lid 1 48 40
2 Survey and air sample interior of ICV 1 53 10
3 Remove ICV Lid 0 29 30
0 33 30
0 38 40
0 42 25
3 Puppet CAM inspection of payload 1 17 01
1 20 41
1 27 58
4 Surveys of payload sides 0 05 30
4 Survey shots 0 38 00
4 Puppet CAM shots 0 42 40
4 Lifting fixture to payload, and lift payload out of ICV 1 27 00
4 Video exam of payload 1 43 40
5 Lift Payload into tent 0 03 25
5 Lift sleeve off payload 0 23 40
5 survey ICV interior 0 45 05
5 Remove sleeving from OCV/ICV cavities 1 29 10
6 Lowr ICV Lid onto cavity 0 03 30
6 Lift ICV out of OCV 0 20 50
6 Lower ICV into disposal box 0 28 30
6 Surveys of OCV cavity 0 41 10
6 OCV lid onto cavity 0 51 55
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Table F-2. (continued).
Start Location on Tape 
(Elapsed Time)
Tape # Description Hr Min Sec
7 Remove work platform half from OCV 0 21 00
7 Remove OCV from Hot Shop 0 43 00
7 Move SWB 02 into hot shop 1 14 30
7 Removing the lid from SWB 02 1 53 25
8 Installing gaskets on SWBs 0 38 45
8 Removal of payload top slip sheet 1 56 40
9 1st Drum Lift to inspection (IDRF004102263, pos. # 2) 0 01 15
9 Lid smears 0 10 10
9 Out of tent 0 35 00
9 Maslin swipe 0 42 18
9 into SWB 0 48 30
9 2nd Drum into inspection area (IDRF004002801, pos. #3) 0 50 00
9 Survey top 0 52 40
9 Tightness check 1 03 00
9 Maslin swipe 1 16 25
9 Into SWB 1 25 15
9 3rd Drum into inspection area (IDRF004101890, pos. #4) 1 30 20
9 Out of tent 1 50 00
9 Maslin swipe 1 54 10
9 Into SWB 1 57 43
9 4th Drum into inspection area (IDRF004102254, pos. #1) 1 59 40
9 Lid smears 2 01 30
10 Out of tent 0 13 15
10 Maslin swipe 0 17 00
10 Into SWB 0 19 30
11
11 5th Drum into inspection area (IDRF004002790, pos. #5) 0 14 50
11 Lid smears 0 15 55
11 Maslin swipe 0 39 00
11 6th Drum into inspection area (IDRF741202088, pos. #7) 0 46 45
11 Lid smears 0 48 40
11 Out of tent 1 07 10
11 Maslin swipe 1 09 20
11 into SWB 1 13 30
11 7th Drum Lid Smears (IDRF741202484, pos. #6) 1 16 45
11 Drum IDRF741202484 2nd lid smears 1 28 30
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Table F-2. (continued).
Start Location on Tape 
(Elapsed Time)
Tape # Description Hr Min Sec
11 Application of fixative 1 54 10
11 Filter tightness check 1 58 37
12 Out of tent 0 01 55
12 Tape below lock ring 0 03 55
12 Lift drum to playpen 0 06 15
12 Maslin swipe 0 09 46
12 Move lock ring on drum 0 13 10
12 Move lock ring -- zoomed 0 14 05
12 Top pack lower slip sheet off 0 27 55
12 Lower pack upper slip sheet off 0 29 50
12 8th Drum to inspection area (IDRF741205405, pos. #8) 0 34 30
12 Check filter and lock ring 0 46 30
12 Out of tent 0 55 55
12 Lift to playpen 0 58 00
12 Maslin swipe 0 59 40
12 Into SWB 1 02 30
12 9th Drum into inspection area (IDRF741201615, pos. #9) 1 05 00
12 Lid smears 1 07 30
12 Bottom smears 1 12 38
12 Check filter and lock ring 1 18 15
12 Out of tent 1 27 10
12 Lift to playpen 1 29 40
12 Maslin swipe 1 31 20
12 Into SWB 1 35 35
12 10th Drum into inspection area (IDRF074700411, pos. #13) 1 38 50
12 Lid smears 1 40 35
12 Side smear 1 43 38
12 Bottom smears 1 45 40
12 Inspection of loose jamb nut 1 51 29
12 Check filter and lock ring 1 54 25
13 Out of tent 0 05 20
13 Lift to playpen 0 07 30
13 Maslin swipe 0 09 15
13 Into SWB 0 13 20
13 11th Drum into inspection area (IDRF741201718, pos. #10) 0 15 48
13 Lid smears 0 17 30
13 Check filter and lock ring 0 26 50
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Table F-2. (continued).
Start Location on Tape 
(Elapsed Time)
Tape # Description Hr Min Sec
13 Out of tent 0 36 11
13 Lift to playpen 0 37 30
13 Maslin swipe 0 39 50
13 Into SWB 0 43 00
13 12th Drum into inspection area (IDRF741204650, pos. #14) 0 46 20
13 Check filter and lock ring 0 50 00
13 Out of tent 0 54 20
13 Lift to playpen 0 57 20
13 Maslin swipe 0 59 35
13 Into SWB 1 02 20
13 13th Drum into inspection area (IDRF074700394, pos. #12) 1 04 13
13 Lid smears 1 06 10
13 Bottom smears 1 09 40
13 Check filter and lock ring 1 16 10
13 Out of tent 1 30 24
13 Lift to playpen 1 32 55
13 Maslin swipe 1 35 45
13 Into SWB 1 38 00
13 14th Drum into inspection area (IDRF074221338, pos. #11) 1 40 15
13 Lid smears 1 41 35
13 Bottom smears 1 45 50
13 Check filter and lock ring 1 49 45
13 Change vestibule 1 58 30
13 Out of tent 1 59 40
13 Lift to playpen 2 01 50
14 Maslin swipe 0 00 00
14 Into SWB 0 00 50
14 Check lock ring seal (t-cup) on contam drum 0 07 25
14 Dunnage drums into SWBs 0 44 15
15 Lid onto SWB IDRFXWB030001 1 22 30
15 Torqueing lid on SWB 01 1 48 05
16 Maslin swipe survey SWBs IDRFXWB030001,-2,-4,-5,-6 1 04 15
16 SWB IDRFXWB030006 out of shop 1 13 10
16 SWB IDRFXWB030004 out of shop 1 20 20
16 Shift SWB 3 out of the way 1 22 15
16 SWB IDRFXWB030001 out of shop 1 25 50
17 Bring SWB IDRFXWB030007 into shop 0 04 15
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Table F-2. (continued).
Start Location on Tape 
(Elapsed Time)
Tape # Description Hr Min Sec
17 Move contaminated drum from SWB 3 to SWB 7 0 40 50
17 Dunnage drums into SWBs 0 51 10
17 Lid onto SWB IDRFXWB030007 0 58 40
17 Bolts into SWB IDRFXWB030007 1 02 50
17 Torqueing lid on SWB IDRFXWB030007 1 17 00
17 Maslin swipe SWBs 1 59 00
18 SWB IDRFXWB03000 out of shop 0 00 30
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Resumes of Investigators
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160 North Morningside Dr. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
(208) 526-3120 (W)
(208) 523-1543 (H)
bho@inel.gov (W)
Barry H. O'Brien 
Summary Nineteen years of experience with chemical process development, pilot 
plant design and operation, and support of plant operations for high-level
radioactive waste processes. Primary areas of expertise are fluidized-
bed technology, solids processing, waste treatment, process control
systems, modeling of aqueous nitrate/nitric acid processes, and 
hazardous waste management. Nine years of experience as a 
supervisor and technical lead. Registered Professional Engineer in 
Chemical Engineering.
Experience 2000–Present Bechtel BWXT Idaho (BBWI) Idaho Falls, ID
Advisory Engineer, ChE Systems Design
 Supported feasibility studies for treatment of non-HLW tank farm wastes
and disposal as remote-handled TRU waste.
 Researched gasification and fuel cell technologies for next generation
Coal Power Plants for Bechtel Power 
 Was process engineer for design of a steam reformer demonstration unit
to convert fossil fuel to hydrogen for use in fuel cells. Became the team
expert on chemistry of the process and served as liason for process
issues for other disciplines. Modeled portions of the process using
ASPEN, OLI, and HSC Chemistry.
 Prepared a feasibility study comparing methods of denitrating and 
grouting radioactive waste for disposal.
 Modeled feed blends and prepared process flowsheets for High Level
Waste Evaporator operation in summer of 2001.
 Provide technical review of documents generated by the ChE Systems
Design and by others. Verified calculations of TMI fuel drying and
Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility fuel cooling requirements
1999-2000 Bechtel BWXT Idaho (BBWI) Idaho Falls, ID
Technical Lead, INTEC RCRA Liquid Sampling
 Sampled waste processes at INTEC to support RCRA permitting of 
waste treatment processes.
 Prepared sampling plans, coordinated sampling with Operations and the
Analytical Laboratories, and interpreted data.
 Managed a sampling budget of $1.2M.
Technical Lead, Process Support
 Led a team to identify and resolve off-gas plugging which caused
shutdown of the New Waste Calciner Facility in May 1999. 
 Provided direct process support and pilot plant testing for existing INTEC
waste systems – High Level Waste Tank Farm, New Waste Calcining
Facility, High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator, and Calcined Solids
Storage Facilities.
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1994-1999 Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Co Idaho Falls, ID
Technical Lead, Process Support
 Provided direct process support and pilot plant testing for existing INTEC
waste systems – High Level Waste Tank Farm, New Waste Calcining
Facility, High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator, and Calcined Solids
Storage Facilities.
 Maintained pilot plant equipment, procedures and training,.
 Managed a permitted hazardous waste storage facility for pilot plant
wastes.
 Directed integrated process modeling for INTEC waste processes,
including the Process Evaporative Waste Evaporator and Liquid Effluent
Treatment and Disposal Facility.
 Managed and tracked budget accounts of $440K and $180K.
 Provided feed flowsheets to Operations for the New Waste Calcining
Facility and High-level Liquid Waste Evaporator at INTEC.
1990-1994 Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Co., Inc. Idaho Falls, ID
Subsection Manager, Pilot Plant Support and Development
 Supervised a group of six engineers and scientists which provided
process development for existing and new plant processes for high-level
radioactive waste through process modeling, laboratory tests, mock-ups,
and pilot-plant testing.
 Prepared schedules and budgets for the subsection with an annual
budget of $800K.
 Prepared feed flowsheets and provided trouble-shooting support for the
New Waste Calcining Facility, a fluidized-bed process for converting
liquid waste to granular solid.
1983-1990 Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Co., Inc. Idaho Falls, ID
Engineer III and Senior Engineer I, High-Level Waste Process
Development
 Performed laboratory tests and modeling for various high-level waste
processes such as the New Waste Calcining Facility, HEPA filter leach, 
and tank farm.
 Supervised construction and startup of the Enclosed 15-cm Diameter
Calciner Pilot Plant.
 Specified, purchased, installed, and configured the distributed control
system for the calciner pilot plants.
 Developed Expert Systems from process data for a fluidized-bed uranyl
nitrate denitrator and radioactive waste calciner.
Education 1978–1982 University of Idaho Moscow, ID
B.S., Chemical Engineering. Graduated Cum Laude.
1982–1983 University of Idaho Moscow, ID
 M.S., Chemical Engineering. 
 Masters Thesis - "A Gradientless Spinning-Film Reactor for Gas-Liquid
and Gas-Liquid-Solid Reaction Studies.”
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Publications/
Presentations
2000 Summary of Waste Calcination at the Idaho Nuclear Technology
and Engineering Center, INEEL/EXT-2000-01206. Co-author 
with B. J. Newby.
2000 NWCF Off-gas Line Restriction Identification and Resolution,
INEEL/EXT-2000-00322. Co-author with J. A. Nenni, R. E. 
Schindler, and R. A. Wood.
2000 NWCF Calciner Emissions Inventory – Final Report for Test 
Series 1, 2, and 3, INEEL/EXT-2000-00114, with L. J. Young 
et. al. 
1995 Estimation of Alkali Metal Mole Percent and Weight of
Calcined Solids for ICPP Calcine, INEL-95/0184.
1993 Calcination Of Fluorinel-Sodium Waste Blends Using Sugar as 
a Feed , WINCO-1130, Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company,
co-author with B. J. Newby and T. D. Thomson.
1991 "Inductive Classification of Pilot Plant Data from a Fluidized
Bed Calciner," presented at ANS Topical Meeting. "AI91 
Frontiers: Innovative Computing for the Nuclear Industry,'
September 1991, Jackson, Wyoming.
1990 "Inductive Classification of Pilot Plant Data from a Fluidized
Bed Calciner," presented at the Westinghouse Artificial
Intelligence/Neural Network Conference, June 1990, Baltimore,
Maryland.
1986 "A Gradientless Spinning Film Reactor for Gas-Liquid and Gas-
Liquid-Solid Reaction Studies," presented at the AIChE
National Conference, November, 1986, Miami, Florida. 
Professional
Societies
 AIChE – Local section webmaster. Have served as treasurer, secretary,
vice-chairman, chairman, and director for the local section.
 ISA – Local Section webmaster and Senior Member. 
Licenses Registered Professional Engineer in Chemical Engineering in Idaho
since 1987.
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Jeffrey M. Lacy 
Work: 526-2788
EDUCATION
Registered Professional Engineer, State of Idaho, since 1995 
M.S., Engineering Mechanics, Montana State University, 1989 
B.S., Civil Engineering, with Honors, Montana State University, 1987
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING EXPERIENCE–15 YEARS 
2002 – Present. Advisory Engineer, Building Technologies and Energy Management, BBWI/INEEL
1999 - 2002. Principal Research Engineer, Aerospace Systems Engineering, BWX Technologies.
1989 - 1999. Staff Engineer, Applied Mechanics, BBWI/INEEL 
1987 - 1989. Engineering Research Assistant, Engineering Mechanics, Montana State University. 
BUILDING TECHNOLOGIES AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT,
BBWI/INEEL, 2002–PRESENT
Principal Investigator on projects involving theoretical and experimental wind flow, energy flow, shock 
and vibration, strength of materials and structural systems.
AEROSPACE ENGINEERING, BWX TECHNOLOGIES, 1999–2002 
Engineering Research
Principal researcher for the engine development of the Solar Orbit Transfer Vehicle Space Experiment. I 
planned and implemented complex physical experiments, wrote the data acquisition and system control
software; designed, evaluated and installed test hardware; reduced and analyzed the data, and wrote test 
plans and reports [1,2].
Automated Systems and Motion Control
Designed, implemented, and programmed multi-axis automated motion systems for phased array
ultrasonic and laser profilometric inspection of manufactured parts, including rectilinear and 
elliptical/helical automated incrementing scans. Involved physical integration of disparate controllers,
amplifiers, motors, and rotary and linear encoders. 
APPLIED MECHANICS, BBWI / INEEL, 1989 – 1999
Performed a variety of design, analysis, and research functions related to nuclear reactor safety, nuclear 
aerospace systems, hurricane wind evaluation, wind tunnel design, and structural response to wind and 
earthquake. Projects over this period included
Aerospace systems 
Topaz-II Joint U.S./Russian Space Program, Lead Structural Engineer, Flight Safety Team Kirtland Air 
Force Base, New Mexico 1993.
USAF/DOE Bimodal Program Design Team, 1993-1994 
SPRE/ISUS Solar Bimodal Engine, 1994.
COMET Nuclear Rocket, 1992. 
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Wind and Buildings Research 
Hurricane Interception and Measurement, Principal Investigator, 1998 – 1999
Pilot Windstorm Center, Design Manager, 1998-1999
Windstorm Simulation Center, Design Lead, 1997 
Manufactured home static and dynamic structural tests, 1998 – 1999
Nuclear Reactor Safety 
Advanced Test Reactor fuel buckling predictions, 1990-1992 
PUBLICATIONS
1. Lacy, J. M., Carmack, W. J., et al, “Creep Response of Rhenium to High-Temperature Cyclic Loads,”
Proceedings of the National Space and Missile Materials Symposium, June 24-28, 2001, Monterey,
CA.
2. Carmack, W. J., Lacy, J. M., et al, “High-Temperature Thermal Conductivity of Graphite Felt 
Insulation,” Proceedings of the National Space and Missile Materials Symposium, June 24-28, 2001,
Monterey, CA. 
3. Richins, W. D., Lacy, J. M., et al, “Full-Scale Structural Testing of a Single-Wide Manufactured
Home,” Proceedings of the World Conference on Timber Engineering, July 31 - Aug. 3, 2000, 
Whistler, BC.
4. Lacy, J. M., Larson, T.K., and Richins, W. D., “Defining Hurricane Winds – Engineers Capture
Georges,” Structure Magazine, Summer 1999 edition, June, 1999. 
5. Lacy, J. M. et al, Operational Requirements and Concept for a Full-Scale Structural Wind Test
Facility, INEEL/INT-99-00838, August, 1999.
6. Oh, C.H., and Lacy, J.M., “Numerical Calculations of Wind Flow in a Full-Scale Wind Test Facility,” 
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KIP E. ARCHIBALD
1914 Burlwood Drive 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Home: 529-8865 
Work: 526-3187
EDUCATION
B. S. Mechanical Engineering, University of Idaho, 1989. 
EXPERIENCE
1999 – present PRINCIPAL ENGINEER , BBWI
Project Team member for the Cold Crucible Induction Melter.
Primary responsibilities include researching and testing of various decontamination and 
waste minimization techniques.
Responsible for planning and conducting evaluations of new waste minimization 
technologies including procuring equipment, directing tests, and evaluating results. 
Responsible for deploying new decontamination techniques at INTEC, training operators
on new techniques, writing and aiding in completing SO tests and operating procedures.
Project Team Member (FY2000) for testing and deployment of NPOx decontamination
process.
Project Team Member for Debris Treatment at the NWCF Facility.
Principal Investigator (FY2001) responsible for making NPOx decontamination process 
mobile and ready for deployment.
Project Team Member for evaluating for a Plasma Etching process that is being 
developed at UCLA. This process is being developed to aid in the decontamination of 
material. Responsibilities were to provide test coupons and to compare this technique to 
other decontamination techniques.
1995 – 1999 PRINCIPAL ENGINEER , LMITCO
Primary responsibilities include researching and testing of various decontamination and 
waste minimization techniques.
Responsible for planning and conducting evaluations of new waste minimization 
technologies including procuring equipment, directing tests, and evaluating results. 
Responsible for implementing new techniques in the plant, training operators on new 
techniques, writing and aiding in completing SO tests and operating procedures.
Project Team Member for installation and testing of NWCF liquid abrasive system. 
Project Team Member for creating waste generator procedure.
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1992 – 1995 SENIOR ENGINEER, WINCO 
Primary responsibilities include researching and testing of various decontamination
methods. Extensive involvement with:
x CO2 Pellet Blasting – Designed a test plan and conducted a 13-week test of the 
CO2 pellet blasting method. 
x Vacuum Systems – Conducted research of all the DOE sites to determine the 
criteria for selecting the vacuum system to be used in ICPP decontamination 
activities.
x Concrete Decontamination – Designed a test plan and conducted testing of three 
concrete decontamination methods. Brought three vendors onsite to demonstrate
proven, new, and experimental methods.
Involved with NEPA, RCRA, Safety, and waste disposal issues while conducting 
demonstrations.
Involved with supporting the upgrade of the NWCF decontamination facility for debris
treatment.
Technical support for the Decontamination and Decommissioning group.
1991 – 1992 ENGINEER, WINCO 
Reviewed and dispositioned Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), Construction Interface 
Documents (CIDs), drawings, and vendor data for the following FPR Projects: 1) siding,
2) roofing, 3) piping, 4) slab tanks, and 5) steel cylindrical vessels.
Developed and performed SO testing. 
1990 – 1991 ENGINEER, WINCO 
Prepared and revised operating procedures, manuals, data sheets, and other
documents for the liquid effluent treatment and disposal (LET&D) system and the PWL 
drain system in support of the New Waste Calcining Facility (NWCF) startup. This 
involved research and development of all technical aspects; as both systems were new
and no previous procedures existed. 
PUBLICATIONS
“CO2 Pellet Blasting Literature Search and Decontamination Scoping Tests Report,” December 1993.
“ICPP Decontamination Development Program,” April 1994.
“Waste Minimization and Decontamination Development at the ICPP,” August 1994.
“A Review of Decontamination Technologies under Development and Demonstration at the ICPP,”
November 1994. 
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“Concrete Decontamination Scoping Tests,” January 1995.
“Development of Waste Minimization and Decontamination Technologies at the Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant,” May 1995. 
“Liquid Abrasive Pressure Pot Scoping Tests Report,” January 1996. 
“CO2 Pellet Blasting Studies,” January 1997.
“Cleaning and Decontamination Using Strippable and Protective Coatings at the Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,” March 1999.
“NWCF Facility Waste Streams,” August 1999. 
“Tests Conducted with Strippable Coatings,” August 1999.
“Nitric Acid/Potassium Permanganate/Oxalic Acid (NPOx) System Modifications,” September 2001.
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/QUALIFICATIONS
Member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) since 1988. 
Trained Radiation and Respirator Worker.
Received a National Award for Pollution Prevention (June 2001) 
REFERENCES
Mike Greene Terry Todd Julia Tripp 
Pr. Tech. Spec. Fellow Engr / Sci. Advisory Engineer 
BBWI BBWI BBWI
526-3239 526-3365 526-3876
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